No abstract

Using data for more than 200 banks from 21 OECD countries for the period 2002 to 2008, we examine the impact of bank regulation and supervision on banking risk. Supervisory control, and regulations on capital and market entry have a significant impact on 'capital and asset risk', while supervisory control and regulations on activities restrictions, private monitoring, market entry, and liquidity, have a significant effect on 'liquidity and market risk'. However, quantile regressions suggest that the effect of regulation and supervision differs across banks: most indicators of bank regulation and supervision do not have a significant effect on low-risk banks, while they do affect high-risk banks.

No abstract

Using data for more than 200 banks from 21 OECD countries for the period 2002 to 2008, we examine the impact of bank regulation and supervision on banking risk. Supervisory control, and regulations on capital and market entry have a significant impact on 'capital and asset risk', while supervisory control and regulations on activities restrictions, private monitoring, market entry, and liquidity, have a significant effect on 'liquidity and market risk'. However, quantile regressions suggest that the effect of regulation and supervision differs across banks: most indicators of bank regulation and supervision do not have a significant effect on low-risk banks, while they do affect high-risk banks.

Using 59 studies, we perform a meta-regression analysis of studies examining the relationship between inflation and central bank independence (CBI). The studies considered are very different with respect to the CBI indicator used, the sample of countries and time periods covered, model specification, estimators used and publication outlet. We conclude that there is a significant publication bias. However, we also find a significant genuine effect of CBI on inflation. Differences between studies are not caused by differences in CBI indicators used.