During 1985–2005, a total of 91 laboratory-confirmed outbreaks of foodborne botulism occurred in Canada; these outbreaks involved 205 cases and 11 deaths. Of the outbreaks, 75 (86.2%) were caused by Clostridium botulinum type E, followed by types A (7, 8.1%) and B (5, 5.7%). Approximately 85% of the outbreaks occurred in Alaska Native communities, particularly the Inuit of Nunavik in northern Quebec and the First Nations population of the Pacific coast of British Columbia. These populations were predominantly exposed to type E botulinum toxin through the consumption of traditionally prepared marine mammal and fish products. Two botulism outbreaks were attributed to commercial ready-to-eat meat products and 3 to foods served in restaurants; several cases were attributed to non-Native home-prepared foods. Three affected pregnant women delivered healthy infants. Improvements in botulism case identification and early treatment have resulted in a reduction in the case-fatality rate in Canada.

A multi-province outbreak of listeriosis occurred in Canada from June to November 2008. Fifty-seven persons were infected with 1 of 3 similar outbreak strains defined by pulsed-field gel electrophoresis, and 24 (42%) individuals died. Forty-one (72%) of 57 individuals were residents of long-term care facilities or hospital inpatients during their exposure period. Descriptive epidemiology, product traceback, and detection of the outbreak strains of Listeria monocytogenes in food samples and the plant environment confirmed delicatessen meat manufactured by one establishment and purchased primarily by institutions was the source of the outbreak. The food safety investigation identified a plant environment conducive to the introduction and proliferation of L. monocytogenes and persistently contaminated with Listeria spp. This outbreak demonstrated the need for improved listeriosis surveillance, strict control of L. monocytogenes in establishments producing ready-to-eat foods, and advice to vulnerable populations and institutions serving these populations regarding which high-risk foods to avoid.

BackgroundInfluenza C virus can cause both upper and lower respiratory tract infections and has been reported to be prevalent in children. However, these infections have been under‐diagnosed, and epidemiological data available are limited due to the lack of convenient detection assays.ObjectiveDesign and validate a real‐time reverse‐transcriptase PCR (rt RT‐PCR) assay for the detection of influenza C.Study designRespiratory samples from two primary settings, namely, children who were hospitalized or seen in the emergency department, and respiratory outbreaks for which no other viral etiology was found were used for the detection of influenza C.Results and ConclusionsThe assay was sensitive and specific for the detection of influenza C. Eleven of 474 (2·32%) patients, all less than 10 years of age, were positive for influenza C. The strains clustered into two lineages, namely C/Kanagawa and C/Sao Paulo, based upon sequencing of the hemagglutinin‐esterase gene. Epidemiological data showed that a higher proportion of influenza C infections occur in younger children and during the winter months. This is the first report of the detection of influenza C in Alberta, Canada, and suggests that the detection of this virus should be included in respiratory virus testing panels.

People who overdosed frequently accessed the health care system in the year before the overdose event. In light of the high rates of health care use, there may be opportunities to identify at-risk individuals before they overdose and connect them with targeted programs and evidence-based interventions. Further work using the BC Provincial Overdose Cohort will focus on identifying risk factors for overdose events and death by overdose.

Background In light of accumulated scientific evidence of the secondary preventive benefits of antiretroviral therapy, a growing number of jurisdictions worldwide have formally started to implement HIV Treatment as Prevention (TasP) programs. To date, no gold standard for TasP program monitoring has been described. Here, we describe the design and methods applied to TasP program process monitoring in British Columbia (BC), Canada. Methods Monitoring indicators were selected through a collaborative and iterative process by an interdisciplinary team including representatives from all five regional health authorities, the BC Centre for Disease Control (BCCDC), and the BC Centre for Excellence in HIV/AIDS (BC-CfE). An initial set of 36 proposed indicators were considered for inclusion. These were ranked on the basis of eight criteria: data quality, validity, scientific evidence, informative power of the indicator, feasibility, confidentiality, accuracy, and administrative requirement. The consolidated list of indicators was included in the final monitoring report, which was executed using linked population-level data. Results A total of 13 monitoring indicators were included in the BC TasP Monitoring Report. Where appropriate, indicators were stratified by subgroups of interest, including HIV risk group and demographic characteristics. Six Monitoring Reports are generated quarterly: one for each of the regional health authorities and a consolidated provincial report. Conclusions We have developed a comprehensive TasP process monitoring strategy using evidence-based HIV indicators derived from linked population-level data. Standardized longitudinal monitoring of TasP program initiatives is essential to optimize individual and public health outcomes and to enhance program efficiencies.

We investigated the proportions of mono vs. mixed infections for human metapneumovirus (hMPV) as compared to adenovirus (ADV), four types of coronavirus (CRV), parainfluenza virus (PIV), RSV, and enterovirus/rhinovirus (ERV) in Alberta, Canada. Using the Data Integration for Alberta Laboratories (DIAL) platform, 26,226 respiratory specimens at ProvLab between 1 July 2009 and 30 June 2012 were selected and included in the study. Using the Respiratory Virus Panel these specimens tested positive for one or more respiratory virus and negative for influenza A and B. From our subset hMPV was the fourth most common virus (n=2,561) with 373 (15%) identified as mixed infection using DIAL. Mixed infection with hMPV was most commonly found in infants less than 6 months old and ERV was most commonly found in mixed infection with hMPV (230/373, 56%) across all age groups. The proportion of mixed-infection vs. mono-infection was highest for ADV (46%), followed by CRV 229E (32%), CRV HKU1 (31%), CRV NL63 (28%), CRV OC43 (23%), PIV (20%), RSV (17%), hMPV (15%) and ERV (13%). hMPV was significantly more likely to be identified in mono infection as compared with ADV, CRV, PIV, and RSV with the exception of ERV [p<0.05].

BackgroundDuring period of crisis, laboratory planners may be faced with a need to make operational and clinical decisions in the face of limited information. To avoid this dilemma, our laboratory utilizes a secure web based platform, Data Integration for Alberta Laboratories (DIAL) to make near real-time decisions.This manuscript utilizes the data collected by DIAL as well as laboratory test cost modeling to identify the relative economic impact of four proposed scenarios of testing for Pandemic H1N1 (2009) and other respiratory viral pathogens.MethodsHistorical data was collected from the two waves of the pandemic using DIAL. Four proposed molecular testing scenarios were generated: A) Luminex respiratory virus panel (RVP) first with/without US centers for Disease Control Influenza A Matrix gene assay (CDC-M), B) CDC-M first with/without RVP, C) RVP only, and D) CDC-M only. Relative cost estimates of different testing algorithm were generated from a review of historical costs in the lab and were based on 2009 Canadian dollars.ResultsScenarios A and B had similar costs when the rate of influenza A was low (< 10%) with higher relative cost in Scenario A with increasing incidence. Scenario A provided more information about mixed respiratory virus infection as compared with Scenario B.ConclusionsNo one approach is applicable to all conditions. Testing costs will vary depending on the test volume, prevalence of influenza A strains, as well as other circulating viruses and a more costly algorithm involving a combination of different tests may be chosen to ensure that tests results are returned to the clinician in a quicker manner. Costing should not be the only consideration for determination of laboratory algorithms.

Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus-positive specimens were collected from autopsy patients and matched to pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus-positive nasopharyngeal specimens from community control patients and pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus-positive specimens from intensive-care unit (ICU) patients. Specimens were analysed for polymorphisms at amino acid 222 of the haemagglutinin (HA) glycoprotein. Whereas some specimens from autopsy patients were positive for D222N, none was positive for D222G. All control patient specimens were wild-type D222. D222G polymorphisms were also identified in a subset of ICU patients with admixtures of D222G and D222 and of D222N, D222G and D222 present. The relevance of D222N and D222G to influenza pathogenesis and transmissibility currently remains unclear.