Possessions can be used to satisfy psychological needs, such as actively creating one's self-concept, reinforcing and expressing self-identity, and allowing one to differentiate oneself and assert one's individuality (e.g., Ball and Tasaki 1992; Belk 1988; Kleine, Kleine, and Allen 1995). Possessions can also serve a social purpose by reflecting social ties to one's family, community, and/or cultural groups, including brand communities (Muniz and O'Guinn 2001). Consumer researchers have extended some of these possession findings to brands (Escalas and Bettman 2003; Fournier 1998). For example, recent research indicates that consumers construct their self-identity and present themselves to others through their brand choices based on the congruency between brand-user associations and self-image associations (Escalas and Bettman 2003). Levy (1959) asserted that people do not buy products just for what they do, but also for what the product means; thus, brands can be symbols whose meaning is used to create and define a consumer's self-concept. McCracken's (1988) model of meaning transfer asserts that such meaning originates in the culturally constituted world, moving into goods via the fashion system, word of mouth, reference groups, subcultural groups, celebrities, and the media. For example, meanings "get into" a brand through advertising because ads reference the general cultural symbols needed to provide meaning. Similarly, reference group usage of a brand provides meaning via the associations consumers hold regarding that group (Muniz and O'Guinn 2001). Next, meaning moves from goods to consumers, as consumers construct

The set of associations consumers have about a brand is an important component of brand equity. In this article, we focus on reference groups as a source of brand associations, which can be linked to one's mental representation of self to meet self-verification or self-enhancement goals. We conceptualize this linkage at an aggregate level in terms of self-brand connections, that is, the extent to which individuals have incorporated a brand into their self-concept. In 2 studies, we show that brands used by member groups and aspiration groups can become connected to consumers' mental representation of self as they use these brands to define and create their self-concepts. Results from Experiment 1 show that the degree to which member group and aspiration group usage influences individual self-brand connections is contingent on the degree to which the individual belongs to a member group or wishes to belong to an aspiration group. In Experiment 2, we found that for individuals with self-enhancement goals, aspiration group brand use has a greater impact on self-brand connections; for individuals with self-verification goals, on the other hand, member group use has a greater impact.A positive brand image is created through building strong, favorable, and unique associations to the brand in memory (Keller, 1993), including user imagery and psychological

This article proposes that narrative processing creates or enhances self-brand connections (SBC) because people generally interpret the meaning of their experiences by fitting them into a story. Similarly, in response to an ad that tells a story, narrative processing may create a link between a brand and the self when consumers attempt to map incoming narrative information onto stories in memory. Our approach rests on the notion that a brand becomes more meaningful the more closely it is linked to the self. We conceptualize this linkage at an aggregate level in terms of SBCs, that is, the extent to which consumers have incorporated the brand into their self-concepts. The results of an experiment show that narrative processing in response to a narratively structured ad is positively related to SBCs, which in turn have a positive relation with brand attitudes and behavioral intentions.

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This article contrasts narrative self-referencing with analytical self-referencing. I propose that narrative self-referencing persuades through transportation, where people become absorbed in a story-in this case, in their storylike thoughts (Green and Brock 2000). When ad viewers are transported by these narrative thoughts, persuasion is not negatively affected by weak ad arguments. Conversely, analytical self-referencing persuades via more traditional processing models, wherein cognitive elaboration is enhanced by relating incoming information to one's self or personal experiences, which results in a differential persuasive effect of strong versus weak arguments. I also propose that ad skepticism moderates the effect of narrative transportation. My assertions are tested in two experiments in the context of mental simulation as a form of narrative self-referencing.