No abstract

This 2023 Clinical Practice Guideline provides the biomedical definition of death based on permanent cessation of brain function that applies to all persons, as well as recommendations for death determination by circulatory criteria for potential organ donors and death determination by neurologic criteria for all mechanically ventilated patients regardless of organ donation potential. This Guideline is endorsed by the Canadian Critical Care Society, the Canadian Medical Association, the Canadian Association of Critical Care Nurses, Canadian Anesthesiologists’ Society, the Canadian Neurological Sciences Federation (representing the Canadian Neurological Society, Canadian Neurosurgical Society, Canadian Society of Clinical Neurophysiologists, Canadian Association of Child Neurology, Canadian Society of Neuroradiology, and Canadian Stroke Consortium), Canadian Blood Services, the Canadian Donation and Transplantation Research Program, the Canadian Association of Emergency Physicians, the Nurse Practitioners Association of Canada, and the Canadian Cardiovascular Critical Care Society. Supplementary Information The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s12630-023-02431-4.

This article addresses the question of how neuroscientific evidence is currently used in the Canadian criminal justice system, with a view to identifying the main contexts in which this evidence is raised, as well as to discern the impact of this evidence on judgements of responsibility, dangerousness, and treatability. The most general Canadian legal database was searched for cases in the five-year period between 2008 and 2012 in which neuroscientific evidence related to the responsibility and recidivism risk of criminal offenders was considered. Canadian courts consider neuroscientific evidence of many types, particularly evidence of prenatal alcohol exposure, traumatic brain injury, and neuropsychological testing. The majority of the cases are sentencing decisions, which is useful given that it offers an opportunity to observe how judges wrestle with the tension that evidence of diminished capacity due to brain damage tends to reduce moral blameworthiness, while it also tends to increase perceptions of risk and dangerousness. This so-called double-edged sword of the biological explanation of criminal behavior was reflected in this study, and raises questions about whether and when the pursuit of such evidence is advisable from the defense perspective.

Given the explosion of research on induced pluripotent stem (iPS) cells, it is timely to consider the various ethical, legal, and social issues engaged by this fast-moving field. Here, we review issues associated with the procurement, basic research, and clinical translation of iPS cells.

A consensus has yet to emerge whether deep brain stimulation (DBS) for treatment-refractory obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) can be considered an established therapy. In 2014, the World Society for Stereotactic and Functional Neurosurgery (WSSFN) published consensus guidelines stating that a therapy becomes established when “at least two blinded randomized controlled clinical trials from two different groups of researchers are published, both reporting an acceptable risk-benefit ratio, at least comparable with other existing therapies. The clinical trials should be on the same brain area for the same psychiatric indication.” The authors have now compiled the available evidence to make a clear statement on whether DBS for OCD is established therapy. Two blinded randomized controlled trials have been published, one with level I evidence (Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale (Y-BOCS) score improved 37% during stimulation on), the other with level II evidence (25% improvement). A clinical cohort study (N = 70) showed 40% Y-BOCS score improvement during DBS, and a prospective international multi-center study 42% improvement (N = 30). The WSSFN states that electrical stimulation for otherwise treatment refractory OCD using a multipolar electrode implanted in the ventral anterior capsule region (including bed nucleus of stria terminalis and nucleus accumbens) remains investigational. It represents an emerging, but not yet established therapy. A multidisciplinary team involving psychiatrists and neurosurgeons is a prerequisite for such therapy, and the future of surgical treatment of psychiatric patients remains in the realm of the psychiatrist.

This scoping review found that there is a large literature on how to modify the process and manner of the request to increase family consent rates. Another important line of inquiry focuses on the psychological impact of the decision on the family. Although a scoping review does not attempt to synthesize results or draw evidence-based conclusions, the literature generally supports the intuitive expectations that compassionate and respectful care for the deceased and family, listening for and addressing family concerns, and an attitude to donation that is positive (but not solely procurement-focused) and is best for both consent rates and family well-being. Although the presumption is often that the primary objective of asking for family consent is to secure consent and donation, some ethical commentary on requesting consent emphasizes that this objective must be balanced with the parallel obligation to protect the psychological well-being of families. This places some constraints on the approaches used in family consent discussions.

In the debate on the ethics of the non-medical use of pharmaceuticals for cognitive performance enhancement in healthy individuals there is a clear division between those who view "cognitive enhancement" as ethically unproblematic and those who see such practices as fraught with ethical problems. Yet another, more subtle issue, relates to the relevance and quality of the contribution of scholarly bioethics to this debate. More specifically, how have various forms of speculation, anticipatory ethics, and methods to predict scientific trends and societal responses augmented or diminished this contribution? In this paper, we use the discussion of the ethics of cognitive enhancement to explore the positive and negative contribution of speculation in bioethics scholarship. First, we review and discuss how speculation has relied on different sets of assumptions regarding the non-medical use of stimulants, namely: (1) terminology and framing; (2) scientific aspects such as efficacy and safety; (3) estimates of prevalence and consequent normalization; and (4) the need for normative reflection and regulatory guidelines. Second, three methodological guideposts are proposed to alleviate some of the pitfalls of speculation: (1) acknowledge assumptions more explicitly and identify the value attributed to assumptions; (2) validate assumptions with interdisciplinary literature; and (3) adopt a broad perspective to promote more comprehensive reflection. We conclude that, through the examination of the controversy about cognitive enhancement, we can employ these methodological guideposts to enhance the value of contributions from bioethics and minimize potential epistemic and practical pitfalls in this case and perhaps in other areas of bioethical debate.

Accountability, responsibility, privacy, and security are key