This article draws upon psychological and sociological literature to explore the issues that arise in eliciting and presenting a refugee narrative when the claim is based upon sexual orientation. Rigid notions of homosexual identity may consciously or subconsciously shape decision-makers' approaches in this field. First, we identify psycho-social issues of particular significance to lesbian, gay and bisexual claimants which may act as barriers to eliciting their narrative of self-identity, including: a reluctance to reveal group membership as the basis of a claim, the experience of passing or concealment strategies, the impact of shame and depression on memory, common experience of sexual assault, and sexualisation of the identity narrative in the legal process. Secondly, we explore factors which inhibit the reception of such narratives in the legal process. In particular we explore the psychological 'stage model' of sexual identity development and examine the pervasive impact this model has had upon decisionmakers' 'pre-understanding' of sexual identity development as a uniform and linear trajectory.

Credibility assessment has always been a major issue in refugee determinations and its importance increases in the context of widespread introduction of 'fast-track' processes and the manifest trans-national trend to truncate (or indeed remove) avenues for review. This article explores the practice of credibility assessment in lower level tribunals using a case study of over 1000 particular social group ground (PSG) decisions made on the basis of sexual orientation over the past 15 years. Credibility played an increasingly major role in claim refusals, and negative credibility assessments were not always based on well-reasoned or defensible grounds. The article uses this specific case study in order to ground recommendations for structural and institutional change aimed at improving the credibility assessment process in refugee determinations more broadly.

is a Senior Lecturer in Law at the University of Sydney. Over the past 10 years she has researched extensively into lesbian and gay family law and relationship recognition in Australia.

In Appellants S395/2002 and S396/2002 v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the High Court of Australia was the first ultimate appellate court to consider a claim to refugee status based upon sexual orientation. By majority the court rejected the notion prevalent in earlier cases that decision-makers could 'expect' refugee applicants to 'co-operate in their own protection' by concealing their sexuality. This paper explores the impact of S395 and S396 on the refugee jurisprudence of Australia and the United Kingdom five years on. Refugee decision-makers in both countries have been slow to fully appreciate the fact that sexual minorities are secretive about their sexuality and relationships as a result of oppressive social forces rather than by 'choice'. In addition, in Australia there has been a clear shift away from discretion towards disbelief as the major area of contest, with a significant increase in decisions where the applicant's claim to actually being gay, lesbian or bisexual is outright rejected. In an alarming number of cases tribunal members used highly stereotyped and westernised notions of 'gayness' as a template against which the applicants were judged. Convention) defines a refugee as any person who 'owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it'. Sexual orientation was accepted as the basis for a particular social group claim in most major refugee receiving nations by the mid-1990s: see,

This article proposes reconsideration of laws prohibiting paid surrogacy in Australia in light of increasing transnational commercial surrogacy. The social science evidence base concerning domestic surrogacy in developed economies demonstrates that payment alone cannot be used to differentiate "good" surrogacy arrangements from "bad" ones. Compensated domestic surrogacy and the introduction of professional intermediaries and mechanisms such as advertising are proposed as a feasible harm-minimisation approach. I contend that Australia can learn from commercial surrogacy practices elsewhere, without replicating them.

STUDY QUESTIONWhat is the impact of law and policy upon the experience of embryo donation for reproductive use?SUMMARY ANSWERAccess to, and experience of, embryo donation are influenced by a number of external factors including laws that impose embryo storage limits, those that frame counselling and approval requirements and allow for, or mandate, donor identity disclosure.WHAT IS KNOWN ALREADYTo date only three qualitative studies in Australia and New Zealand have been completed on the experience of embryo donation for reproductive purposes, each with a small cohort of interviewees and divergent findings.STUDY DESIGN, SIZE, DURATIONEmbryo donors, recipients, and would-be donors were interviewed between July 2010 and July 2012, with three additional interviews between September 2015 and September 2016, on their experiences of embryo donation. The sampling protocol had the advantage of addressing donation practices across multiple clinical sites under distinct legal frameworks.PARTICIPANTS/MATERIALS, SETTINGS, METHODSParticipants were recruited from five Australian jurisdictions and across 11 clinical sites. Twenty-six participants were interviewed, comprising: 11 people who had donated embryos for the reproductive use of others (nine individuals and one couple), six recipients of donated embryos (four individuals and one couple) and nine individuals who had attempted to donate, or had a strong desire to donate, but had been prevented from doing so. In total, participants reported on 15 completed donation experiences; of which nine had resulted in offspring to the knowledge of the donor.MAIN RESULTS AND THE ROLE OF CHANCEDonors positively desired donation and did not find the decision difficult. Neither donors nor recipients saw the donation process as akin to adoption . The process and practice of donation varied considerably across different jurisdictions and clinical sites.LIMITATIONS, REASONS FOR CAUTIONBecause the pool of donors and recipients is small, caution must be exercised over drawing general conclusions. Saturation was not reached on themes of counselling models and future contact.WIDER IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGSThe differences between our findings and those of a previous study are attributable to varied legal and counselling regimes. Therefore, law and policy governing embryo storage limits, counselling protocols and identity disclosure shape the donation experience and how it is described.STUDY FUNDING/COMPETING INTEREST(S)This research was supported by Discovery Project Grants DP 0986213 and 15010157 from the Australian Research Council and additional funding from UTS: Law. There are no conflicts of interest to declare.TRIAL REGISTRATION NUMBERNot applicable.

This is a pre-print version of an article that will appear in (2008) AbstractThis article contends that the 'functional family' model falters in the context of lesbian and gay intra-family disputes. Functional family arguments have frequently been misused in disputes between separated lesbian mothers who are contesting issues around children and in disputes between lesbian mothers and known sperm donors/biological fathers. I argue that the rise of fathers' rights movements and increasing emphasis on biological family gives both discursive and legal authority to essentialised, gendered and symbolic status claims made by biological parents, valorising distant biological fathers over mother-led family units, and separated biological mothers over non-biological mothers.Finding that the functional family approach cannot usefully resist the current ideological climate, the article concludes with an exploration of an alternative: framing a form of status claim for lesbian co-parents based on intentionality.

This article reports on our analysis of 120 refugee cases from Australia, Canada, and Britain where an actual or threatened forced marriage was part of the claim for protection.We found that forced marriage was rarely considered by refugee decision makers to be a harm in and of itself. This ¢nding contributes to understanding how gender and sexuality are analysed within refugee law, because the harm of forced marriage is experienced di¡erently by lesbians, gay men and heterosexual women.We contrast our ¢ndings in the refugee case law with domestic initiatives in Europe aimed at protecting nationals from forced marriages both within Europe and elsewhere. We pay particular attention to British initiatives because they are in many ways the most farreaching and innovative, and thus the contrast with the response of British refugee law is all the more stark.