This study assesses the effects of U.S. involvement in international cri ses on the domestic popularity of American presidents for all major classes of voters. Using a time series analysis of monthly presidential approval and crisis involvement between 1953 and 1994, and controlling for eco nomic conditions and structural features of presidential popularity, it is apparent that crisis activity does increase the president's popularity, albeit by a very small margin. This result holds for both overall approval levels and within each president's "ruling coalition" of partisans as well as inde pendent voters; opposition party voters generally do not "rally 'round the flag." The small rally effect for crisis activity diminishes, however, when the U.S. president uses force, and when the Soviets are not involved. Furthermore, the rally effect actually seems to depend on the level of presidential response to a crisis; higher levels of response would account for rally effects. Taking the analysis one step further, it is revealed that outcomes of international crises (that is, how the U.S. fared) generally do not affect presidential popularity, even when examined with various lags. The investigation concludes with suggestions for further research on link age politics.
The analogy that states in the international system act as firms in a market has been used by scholars to explain the initiation of war and the formation of balances of power, among other things. Here, this analogy is explored further in an attempt to formalize and quantify the age‐old concept of diplomatic reputation. In this paper, I argue that states, like firms, invest in their reputation in order to secure future benefits, which might take the form of bargaining advantages. Investment in reputation is accomplished by escalating crises, in order to deter other states from initiating future crises. The resulting model of reputation‐building is tested empirically using International Crisis Behavior data on United States involvement in international crises for the years 1918–1988. The results support the model developed here; it appears that we can measure the concept of diplomatic reputation, and once a strong reputation is established, the United States does become involved in fewer crises. Furthermore, a hypothesis predicting more crisis activity during new presidential administrations is supported. Domestically, empirical evidence also is found linking diplomatic reputation with presidential approval levels.
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