International Crises and Linkage Politics: The Experiences of the United States, 1953-1994

James, Patrick; Rioux, Jean Sebastien

doi:10.1177/106591299805100311

Cited by 52 publications

(37 citation statements)

References 50 publications

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“…Some scholars find a correlation between war and the increased leverage it gives the president (Norrander and Wilcox ; Parker ; Rudalevige ). James and Rioux (), on the other hand, find war has the opposite effect and actually affects the president negatively. Howell () and Marra, Ostrom, and Simon ) find war matters, though the relationship is not consistent for all conditions.…”

Section: Dependent and Independent Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Unilateral Presidential Policy Making and the Impact of Crises

Young

2013

Pres Stud Q

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Scholars interested in the power of the presidency often overlook the importance of a crisis. The right kind of event, however, has characteristics that create a window of opportunity for a president to exert or expand his unilateral power. Failure to explore this relationship leaves a gap in our knowledge regarding presidential power, which this article addresses. The results show foreign policy crises provide the largest window for a president to increase his authority. Economic crises and most natural disasters have little to no impact on unilateral power. Epidemic outbreaks are the exception, though compared to a foreign policy crisis, the impact is relatively small. Finally, the findings suggest a president suffering from institutional constraints or lacking in skill and will has the ability to increase his power whenever a foreign policy crisis occurs.

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Section: Dependent and Independent Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Unilateral Presidential Policy Making and the Impact of Crises

Young

2013

Pres Stud Q

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“…Richards et al (1993) posit that the primary domestic utility of force usage derives not from its capacity to temporarily divert popular attention from leadership failings, but from the opportunity it affords leaders to offset domestic perceptions of managerial incompetence through international victories (see also Downs and Rocke's [1995] work on "gambling for resurrection"). James and Rioux, 1998;Bennett and Nordstrom, 2000). Employing psychological factors that take intent into explicit account, Keller and Foster's (2009) discovery of the positive effects of leaders' self-confidence and of their own beliefs about their ability to control external events on force 15 For instance, the failure to resolve this issue leaves confusion regarding which states distressed leaders target during periods of domestic difficulty.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rallies and the “First Image”

Foster

Keller

2010

Conflict Management and Peace Science

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Despite considerable scholarship regarding the degree to which the international use of force generates popular rallies, no work has addressed the possibility that leaders' managerial philosophies and psychological predispositions systematically influence their assessments of whether or not diversion "works". In this article, we test hypotheses-conceived through direct reference to work in political psychology-which suggest that the degree to which presidents are innately concerned with the maintenance of the American "in-group" is an important predictor of whether they scapegoat international "out-groups" and, by extension, whether they choose strategies of diversionary foreign conflict or more cordial foreign engagement when facing domestic problems. Several analyses of American foreign policy behavior for the period 1953-2000 produce findings that clearly are at odds with these hypotheses, in that in-group biased presidents are actually less likely to use force and more likely to attend superpower summits when faced with a poor economy. We believe that these unexpected findings have serious implications for both the psychological study of international conflict and the plausibility of the "traditional" diversionary hypothesis.Exactly how does the international use of force help leaders who face domestic political problems? According to several classical and contemporary international relations theorists, the answer to this question lies in the effects of international conflict involvement on group dynamics. In particular, the "traditional" diversionary hypothesis, which derives from socio-psychological treatises on group cohesion (Simmel, 1955;Coser, 1956), posits that conflicts with out-group rivals are likely to generate bursts of patriotic fervor. These "rallies", by effacing in-group disunity, subsequently redirect popular attention away from domestic problems. As such, leaders are alleged to have regular incentives to use force abroad when domestic

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“…He demonstrates support for his argument using US presidential approval data. Several other studies have found that the average rally effect, though positive, is quite modest (Lian and Oneal 1993; Oneal and Bryan 1995; James and Rioux 1998).…”

Section: Responding To Economic Turmoilmentioning

confidence: 85%

Why Not Guns and Butter: Responses to Economic Turmoil

Arena

2010

Foreign Policy Analysis

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Diversionary approaches rarely explain why leaders use force in response to economic turmoil rather than addressing the problem directly. Those few studies that do address this often assume leaders can either respond with foreign policy or economic policy, but not both. I develop a formal model in which governments may employ macroeconomic policy tools, enter into an international crisis, or both. The results indicate that the relationship between economic conditions and the decision to use force may be either positive or negative. I discuss the implications with respect to recent empirical studies of the link between economic conditions and international conflict.The possibility that domestically vulnerable leaders might be more likely to enter into international conflicts has long concerned scholars of international relations. 1 Thus far, the empirical record is mixed. Perhaps this is because the diversionary argument has so many variants. Scholars disagree over what form of domestic turmoil is sufficient to motivate diversion, 2 which states are most likely to engage in such behavior, 3 who the likely targets are, 4 and what type of behavior leaders employ when seeking to divert. 5 Overall, we still lack a clear understanding of when and why leaders might divert.Relatively few scholars have answered the question raised by Fordham (1998:419): ''Why would a president resort to a diversionary use of force? Why not simply implement policies to deal directly with the problems generating domestic discontent?'' Fordham provides one answer, which focuses on the need for leaders to simultaneously please both elite and mass constituencies, whose demands at times conflict. Brule (2006) provides another, arguing that Author's note: I thank two anonymous reviewers, as well as many colleagues for helpful comments, including: on the state of the economy, Brule (2006) on policy availability, Miller (1999) andEnterline and Gleditsch (2000) on protests and rebellion. The discussion of presidential approval in particular has been very muddied, with one study (Leeds and Davis 1997) claiming that Ostrom and Job found the precise opposite effect of what they report.3 Miller (1999), Enterline and Gleditsch (2000) and Pickering and Kisangani (2005) all question the assumption that democracies are more prone to diverting. 4 Mitchell and Prins (2004) emphasize rivals, while Foster (2006) argues that it is nonrivals. 5 Several scholars have noted that diversionary theory need not pertain to war (Levy 1989). Pickering and Kisangani (2007) discuss the use of benevolent force in socioeconomic interventions versus more traditional military force for politico-strategic reasons.

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International Crises and Linkage Politics: The Experiences of the United States, 1953-1994

Cited by 52 publications

References 50 publications

Unilateral Presidential Policy Making and the Impact of Crises

Unilateral Presidential Policy Making and the Impact of Crises

Rallies and the “First Image”

Why Not Guns and Butter: Responses to Economic Turmoil

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