PERVASIVE computing 53Trust is situation-specific; trust in one environment doesn't directly transfer to another environment. So a notion of context is necessary.Authorized licensed use limited to: TRINITY COLLEGE DUBLIN. Downloaded on January 21, 2009 at 05:54 from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.them in a particular way-for example, to update old address book entries with accurate information. However, the principal could deviate from this expected behavior, and the combined likelihood and severity of this is the risk of granting them a privilege. Risk analysisIn SECURE, the risks of a trust-mediated action are decomposed by possible outcomes. Each outcome's risk depends on the other principal's trustworthiness (the likelihood) and the outcome's intrinsic cost. For example, an address update might itself be out-of-date or maliciously misleading. These two outcomes' costs would reflect the user's wasted time, and the likelihoods would depend on trust in the other party.An outcome's costs could span a range of values. For example, a user might have received a correct phone book entry. This third outcome's cost could show a net benefit to the user, as the user might successfully use it later. However, if the number became out-ofdate by the time it was used, that would be a net loss. To reflect this uncertainty, you might represent the distribution of costs as a cost-PDF (probability density function). Figure 1 illustrates a user contemplating a parameterized interaction with principal p. For each possible outcome, the user has a parameterized cost-PDF (a family of cost-PDFs) that represents the range of possible costs and benefits the user might incur should each outcome occur.While the risk evaluator assesses the possible cost-PDFs, the trust calculator provides information t that determines the risk's likelihood based on the principal's identity p and other parameters of the action. The risk evaluator then uses this trust information to select the appropriate cost-PDF.Finally, the request analyzer combines all the outcomes' cost-PDFs to decide if the action should be taken or to arrange further interaction. Because any uncertainty is preserved right up to the decision point, this allows more complex decision making than simple thresholding, allowing responses such as "not sure" if there isn't enough information.In our continuing example, if Liz's PDA received a phone number from Vinny's PDA, she might not think it was maliciously misleading based on her trust in Vinny's honesty. She might think it could be out-of-date, however, if Vinny had given her stale information before, attributing a higher risk to this outcome. Finally, she'd consider the potential benefit of having a correct number, again moderated by Vinny's trustworthiness. Liz's PDA would do all these calculations on her behalf using its model of her trust beliefs, as Figure 2 illustrates. If the benefits outweighed the other outcomes' costs, the PDA would then accept the information.On the other hand, if John-a colleague from a competing research gr...

Abstract. Both privacy and trust relate to knowledge about an entity. However, there is an inherent conflict between trust and privacy: the more knowledge a first entity knows about a second entity, the more accurate should be the trustworthiness assessment; the more knowledge is known about this second entity, the less privacy is left to this entity. This conflict needs to be addressed because both trust and privacy are essential elements for a smart working world. The solution should allow the benefit of adjunct trust when entities interact without too much privacy loss. We propose to achieve the right trade-off between trust and privacy by ensuring minimal trade of privacy for the required trust. We demonstrate how transactions made under different pseudonyms can be linked and careful disclosure of such links fulfils this right trade-off.

Abstract. The possibility of a massive, networked infrastructure of diverse entities partaking in collaborative applications with each other increases more and more with the proliferation of mobile devices and the development of ad hoc networking technologies. In this context, traditional security measures do not scale well. We aim to develop trust-based security mechanisms using small world concepts to optimise formation and propagation of trust amongst entities in these vast networks. In this regard, we surmise that in a very large mobile ad hoc network, trust, risk, and recommendations can be propagated through relatively short paths connecting entities. Our work describes the design of trust-formation and risk-assessment systems, as well as that of an entity recognition scheme, within the context of the small world network topology.

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The recent popularity of trail running and the use of portable sensors capable of measuring many performance results have led to the growth of new fields in sports science experimentation. Trail running is a challenging sport; it usually involves running uphill, which is physically demanding and therefore requires adaptation to the running style. The main objectives of this study were initially to use three “low-cost” sensors. These low-cost sensors can be acquired by most sports practitioners or trainers. In the second step, measurements were taken in ecological conditions orderly to expose the runners to a real trail course. Furthermore, to combine the collected data to analyze the most efficient running techniques according to the typology of the terrain were taken, as well on the whole trail circuit of less than 10km. The three sensors used were (i) a Stryd sensor (Stryd Inc. Boulder CO, USA) based on an inertial measurement unit (IMU), 6 axes (3-axis gyroscope, 3-axis accelerometer) fixed on the top of the runner’s shoe, (ii) a Global Positioning System (GPS) watch and (iii) a heart belt. Twenty-eight trail runners (25 men, 3 women: average age 36 ± 8 years; height: 175.4 ± 7.2 cm; weight: 68.7 ± 8.7 kg) of different levels completed in a single race over a 8.5 km course with 490 m of positive elevation gain. This was performed with different types of terrain uphill (UH), downhill (DH), and road sections (R) at their competitive race pace. On these sections of the course, cadence (SF), step length (SL), ground contact time (GCT), flight time (FT), vertical oscillation (VO), leg stiffness (Kleg), and power (P) were measured with the Stryd. Heart rate, speed, ascent, and descent speed were measured by the heart rate belt and the GPS watch. This study showed that on a ≤10 km trail course the criteria for obtaining a better time on the loop, determined in the test, was consistency in the effort. In a high percentage of climbs (>30%), two running techniques stand out: (i) maintaining a high SF and a short SL and (ii) decreasing the SF but increasing the SL. In addition, it has been shown that in steep (>28%) and technical descents, the average SF of the runners was higher. This happened when their SL was shorter in lower steep and technically challenging descents.

Abstract. Pervasive computing requires some level of trust to be established between entities. In this paper we argue for an entity recognition based approach to building this trust which differs from starting from more traditional authentication methods. We also argue for the concept of a "pluggable" recognition module which allows different recognition schemes to be used in different circumstances. Finally, we propose that the trust in the underlying infrastructure has to be taken into account when considering end-to-end trust.