In Western dualistic culture, it is assumed that thoughts cannot be treated as material objects; however, language is replete with metaphorical analogies suggesting otherwise. In the research reported here, we examined whether objectifying thoughts can influence whether the thoughts are used in subsequent evaluations. In Experiment 1, participants wrote about what they either liked or disliked about their bodies. Then, the paper on which they wrote their thoughts was either ripped up and tossed in the trash or kept and checked for errors. When participants physically discarded a representation of their thoughts, they mentally discarded them as well, using them less in forming judgments than did participants who retained a representation of their thoughts. Experiment 2 replicated this finding and also showed that people relied on their thoughts more when they physically kept them in a safe place-putting their thoughts in their pockets-than when they discarded them. A final study revealed that these effects were stronger when the action was performed physically rather than merely imagined.

This article hypothesizes that the individual-difference variable, need for cognition (NFC), can have opposite implications for priming effects, depending on prime blatancy. Subtle primes are argued to be more effective for high- versus low-NFC individuals. This is because for high-NFC individuals, (a) constructs are generally easier to activate, (b) their higher amount of thought offers more opportunity for an activated construct to bias judgment, and (c) their thoughtfully formed judgments are more likely to affect behavior. However, because high-NFC individuals are adept at identifying and correcting for bias, with blatant primes the activated construct should be less likely to exert its default influence. Furthermore, with blatant primes, low-NFC individuals may achieve sufficient activation for primes to affect judgment. Across three studies, it is shown that as NFC increases, the magnitude of priming effects increases with a subtle prime but decreases with a blatant prime.

The present research examines two main issues relevant to consumer persuasion: (1) whether automatic evaluations can change (both directly and indirectly) in response to verbal ads that engage deliberative information processing activity, and (2) whether such messages can result in spreading activation of implicit change that is consistent with balance principles. The first study showed that automatic evaluations of vegetables were more favorable after people read a health ad than a control message. The results of Study 2 showed that automatic associations toward Heineken (a brand associated with the color green) were also more favorable as a result of processing a message advocating the color green than a neutral control message. Consistent with the idea that automatic changes can be consequential not only for brands but also for consumer identity, participants of Study 3 showed more automatic self-vegetable associations after thinking about the benefits (rather than the negative consequences) of consuming vegetables. A final study revealed that false feedback increasing (vs. decreasing) self-product identity led to more favorable automatic attitudes toward the product, but only for those with relatively high scores on the implicit measure of selfesteem. Taken together, this series of studies suggests that automatic changes that result from consumer persuasion are consequential in terms of spreading activation and that they seem to respond to balance principles.

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The present research proposes that sources in the numerical majority (vs. minority) can affect persuasion by influencing the confidence with which people hold their thoughts in response to the persuasive message. Participants received a persuasive message composed of either strong or weak arguments that was presented by a majority or a minority source. Consistent with the self-validation hypothesis, we predicted and found that the majority (vs. minority) status of the source increased the confidence with which recipients held their thoughts. As a consequence, majority (vs. minority) sources increased argument quality effects in persuasion when source status information followed message processing (Experiment 1). In contrast, when the information regarding source status preceded (rather than followed) the persuasive message, it validated the perception of the position advocated, reducing message processing. As a consequence of having more confidence in the position advocated before receiving the message, majority (vs. minority) sources reduced argument quality effects in persuasion (Experiment 2). Finally, Experiment 3 isolated the timing of the source status manipulation, revealing that sources in the numerical majority (vs. minority) can increase or decrease persuasion to strong arguments depending on whether source status is introduced before or after processing the message.

En el presente trabajo se describen los principales procesos psicológicos a través de los cuales las emociones influyen sobre el cambio de actitudes. La primera parte de la presente revisión se ocupa de la relación entre emoción y cognición, en ella se describen cómo las emociones influyen sobre la forma en que se procesa la información persuasiva (e.g., afectando a la cantidad y dirección de pensamientos generados ante una propuesta). A continuación, se examina cómo las emociones pueden cambiar no sólo los pensamientos que vienen a la mente, sino también lo que pensamos sobre dichos pensamientos (metacognición). La investigación meta-cognitiva revisada demuestra que las emociones pueden hacer que las personas confíen o desconfíen tanto de lo que piensan como de lo que sienten. En concreto, varios paradigmas experimentales sugieren que las emociones pueden validar o invalidar a otras emociones (e.g., sentirse triste de sentir alegría) y pensamientos (e.g., sentir ira de pensar algo). Por otra parte, no sólo las emociones, sino también los pensamientos pueden validar o invalidar lo que se piensa y lo que se siente (e.g., en función de la facilidad con la que los pensamientos y emociones vienen a la mente).

This meta-analysis evaluated theoretical predictions from balanced identity theory (BIT) and evaluated the validity of zero points of Implicit Association Test (IAT) and self-report measures used to test these predictions. Twenty-one researchers contributed individual subject data from 36 experiments (total N = 12,773) that used both explicit and implicit measures of the social–cognitive constructs. The meta-analysis confirmed predictions of BIT’s balance–congruity principle and simultaneously validated interpretation of the IAT’s zero point as indicating absence of preference between two attitude objects. Statistical power afforded by the sample size enabled the first confirmations of balance–congruity predictions with self-report measures. Beyond these empirical results, the meta-analysis introduced a within-study statistical test of the balance–congruity principle, finding that it had greater efficiency than the previous best method. The meta-analysis’s full data set has been publicly archived to enable further studies of interrelations among attitudes, stereotypes, and identities.

Three experiments examined whether perceiving thoughts as coming from internal versus external origins are more impactful on attitudes. Participants generated either positive or negative thoughts about different attitude objects, including different diets, and plastic surgery. Then, participants were induced to think that their thoughts came from the self or from an external source. In Experiment 1, participants induced to believe their thoughts originated from the self versus an external source relied on them more to form their attitudes. Experiment 2 demonstrated that when the external origin was associated with properties of validity, people relied on their thoughts more than when thoughts were perceived to come from an internal origin associated with low validity. Experiment 3 showed that the impact of thought origin on evaluations was mediated by greater liking for one's thoughts when they originated in the self.