Biological threat detection programs that collect air samples and monitor for large-scale release of biowarfare agents generate large numbers of samples that must be quickly and accurately screened for the presence of biological agents. An impediment to the rapid analysis of large numbers of environmental biological samples is that manual laboratory processes are time-consuming and require resources to maintain infrastructure, trained personnel, and adequate supplies of testing reagents. An ideal screening system would be capable of processing multiple samples rapidly, cost-effectively, and with minimal personnel. In the present study, we evaluated the Automated Biological Agent Testing System (ABATS) to explore the capability of automation to increase sample throughput, maximize system accuracy, and reduce the analysis costs associated with biological threat agent screening in environmental samples. This study demonstrates the utility of this concept and the potential of an automated system to address the growing environmental monitoring needs of the United States.
The Biosurveillance Portal (BSP) is a web-based tool that currently is being developed by the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense. The BSP will ultimately facilitate collaboration, communication, information sharing, and provide a centralization of biosurveillance resources in support of the detection, management and mitigation of biological events. The BSP is being developed based on U.S. Special Operations Command biosurveillance requirements. As additional stakeholders are engaged and the BSP matures it will provide information sharing across the DoD biosurveillance community of interest and other government agencies to promote a whole of government biosurveillance capability.
The world population will continue to face biological threats, whether they are naturally occurring or intentional events. The speed with which diseases can emerge and spread presents serious challenges, because the impact on public health, the economy, and development can be huge. The U.S. government recognizes that global public health can also have an impact on national security. This global perspective manifests itself in U.S. policy documents that clearly articulate the importance of biosurveillance in providing early warning, detection, and situational awareness of infectious disease threats in order to mount a rapid response and save lives. In this commentary, we suggest that early recognition of infectious disease threats, whether naturally occurring or man-made, requires a globally distributed array of interoperable hardware and software fielded in sufficient numbers to create a network of linked collection nodes. We argue that achievement of this end state will require a degree of cooperation that does not exist at this time-either across the U.S. federal government or among our global partners. Successful fielding of a family of interoperable technologies will require interagency research, development, and purchase ("acquisition") of biosurveillance systems through cooperative ventures that likely will involve our strategic allies and public-private partnerships. To this end, we propose leveraging an existing federal interagency group to integrate the acquisition of technologies to enable global biosurveillance.
The US Department of Defense (DOD) established programs to defend against chemical and biological weapons 100 years ago because military leaders understood that the operational capability of the US military is diminished when service member health is compromised. These threats to operational readiness can be from an overt attack using chemical and biological threats but may also arise from natural exposures. In the current era of rapidly emerging technologies, adversaries are not only rediscovering chemical and biological weapons; they are also displaying an increased propensity to employ them to cause strategic instability among deployed forces or nations undergoing conflict. The United States's investments in its Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) can be a critical enabler of the third offset strategy, which is a DOD initiative that seeks to maximize force capability to offset emerging threats. To realize this vision, the CBDP must make fundamental changes in acquiring and employing effective technologies so that enemy use of chemical and biological agents against US assets is no longer a viable option. Maximization of US force health status will provide a strategic advantage over theater opponents more vulnerable to operational degradation from chemical and biological threats.
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