The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that: • a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in DRO • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.

The authors tested whether self-efficacy, coping styles, family cohesion, and meaning in life predicted family satisfaction among 64 mothers of children with disabilities. They also examined whether meaning in life mediated the relationship between cohesion and family satisfaction or served as a resource whose effects on family satisfaction were mediated by coping and cohesion. Stress, meaning in life, emotion-oriented coping, and family cohesion predicted 31% of the variance in family satisfaction. Family cohesion fully mediated the relationships between stress, meaning in life, and emotion-oriented coping on one hand and family satisfaction on the other. Mothers with lower stress exhibited higher meaning; those utilizing less emotion-oriented coping had higher family cohesion. Mothers with higher family cohesion had higher family satisfaction.

(2010) 'The exclusion of (failed) asylum seekers from housing and home : towards an oppositional discourse.', Journal of law and society., 37 (2). pp. 285-314. Further information on publisher's website:http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j. 1467-6478.2010.00505.x Publisher's copyright statement:The denitive version is available at www.interscience.wiley.com Additional information: Use policyThe full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that:• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in DRO • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.Please consult the full DRO policy for further details. Abstract:The reality of human experience is that ‗housing' -which usually connotes the practical provision of a roof over one's head -is experienced by users as ‗home' -broadly described as housing plus the experiential elements of dwelling. Conversely, the condition of being without housing, commonly described as ‗homelessness', is experienced not only as an absence of shelter but in the philosophical sense of ‗ontological homelessness' and alienation from the conditions for well-being: the practical and psychological benefits that flow from having an opportunity to establish a home. For asylum seekers, these experiences are deliberately and explicitly excluded from official law and policy discourses. This article demonstrates how, in the case of asylum seekers, law and policy is propelled by an ‗official discourse' based on the denial of housing and the avoidance of ‗home' attachments, which effectively keeps the asylum seeker in a state of ontological homelessness and alienation. We reflect on how considerations of housing and home are excluded from policy debates and even legal analyses concerning asylum seekers, and consider how a new ‗oppositional discourse' of housing and home -which allowed these considerations to be taken into account -might impact on the balancing exercise inherent to laws and policies concerning asylum seekers.Durham Law School, 50 North Bailey, Durham, England, DH1 3ET; lorna.fox@durham.ac.uk; j.a.sweeney@durham.ac.uk. We are grateful to the Institute of Advanced Study at Durham University, whose generous support facilitated the research project on which this article is based, and to David O'Mahony who provided helpful comments on an earlier draft.

Use policyThe full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-pro t purposes provided that:• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in DRO • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.

This article undertakes a comparative legal analysis of the scope of an emerging legal duty to find the truth about historical human rights abuses after periods of political transition. There is substantial inconsistency between human rights regimes on how they establish temporal jurisdiction in their transitional jurisprudence, which has not yet been systematically investigated. This contribution fills the gap in the literature by identifying and critiquing the way in which the right to truth in times of transition is both expressly and implicitly vindicated in the decisions of the Human Rights Committee, and the regional jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and European Court of Human Rights (the conclusion also addresses the less voluminous African regional jurisprudence). It is argued that the ‘underlying values’ of human rights treaties can provide a foundation for a powerful but finite right to truth.

This article documents the findings of an empirical project combining socio-legal and media studies, which examined journalists’ perceptions of their role in relation to transitional justice in Kosovo. Based upon the qualitative analysis of 30 semi-structured interviews with professional journalists in Kosovo during the summer of 2018, the article shows that key issues in the study of transitional justice appear in respect of what, building on notions of ‘peace journalism’, can be termed ‘transitional journalism’. Issues include the extent to which ‘transitional journalism’ is, or should be, a distinct ‘field’ at all; as well as debates about the relative priority to give to accountability, reconciliation, historical accounting, or victims’ rights within the practice of ‘transitional journalism’ at any given time. Identifying and engaging with these issues will allow greater agency in, and ownership of, decisions taken about ‘transitional journalism’.

What happened at Vatican II and the significance of its decisions is strongly contested in the Church today. There is a struggle over the memory of the Council. It is suggested that two hermeneutics are in use, continuity versus discontinuity. On the one hand, it is said that privileging the ‘event’ of the Council as the interpretative key for reading its documents leads to an ideological distortion and introduces discontinuity with tradition. On the other hand, it is held that the continuity thesis plays down the real changes the Council introduced and, while unexceptional as a theological principle, it is being deployed as a polemical ideology, restricting necessary change. This article distinguishes between theological principle and experience in relation to continuity/discontinuity. It argues that the event of the Council is to be found as much in its effects in the Church at large as what took place in Rome. It analyses the phenomenology of change at both levels and concludes that the tensions between the need for continuity and the impulses of discontinuity need to be recognised and worked with rather than repressed.

This article charts the interplay between universality and particularism in the approach of the European Court of Justice to national restrictions upon the four freedoms. Comparisons are made with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. It is shown that both courts allow a national 'margin of appreciation' within which overlapping European and local public interests can be balanced. The article draws inspiration from research into the impact of the margin of appreciation upon the universality of human rights in order to understand the potential of the doctrine for the enlarged European Union. The doctrine is placed within a normative framework based upon the European Union as an 'essentially contested' project. The use of the doctrine by the European Court of Justice is analysed then in the light of this framework, with particular emphasis placed upon the existence of outer limits to the doctrine, and the factors that guide its width. * Lecturer, Department of Law, Durham University (UK). Thank you to Ian Ward and Stephen Weatherill, who read and commented upon an earlier draft of this work. The usual disclaimer applies. 1. See I. Ward, 'The Culture of Enlargement' (2005) 12 Columbia Journal of European Law 199. 2. Similar issues have arisen in respect of state aids, but will not be discussed here; E. Psychogiopoulou, 'EC State Aid Control and Cultural Justifications' (2006) 33 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 3.