No abstract

We propose to change the default P-value threshold for statistical significance from 0.05 to 0.005 for claims of new discoveries. T he lack of reproducibility of scientific studies has caused growing concern over the credibility of claims of new discoveries based on 'statistically significant' findings. There has been much progress toward documenting and addressing several causes of this lack of reproducibility (for example, multiple testing, P-hacking, publication bias and under-powered studies). However, we believe that a leading cause of non-reproducibility has not yet been adequately addressed: statistical standards of evidence for claiming new discoveries in many fields of science are simply too low. Associating statistically significant findings with P < 0.05 results in a high rate of false positives even in the absence of other experimental, procedural and reporting problems.For fields where the threshold for defining statistical significance for new discoveries is P < 0.05, we propose a change to P < 0.005. This simple step would immediately improve the reproducibility of scientific research in many fields. Results that would currently be called significant but do not meet the new threshold should instead be called suggestive. While statisticians have known the relative weakness of using P ≈ 0.05 as a threshold for discovery and the proposal to lower it to 0.005 is not new 1,2 , a critical mass of researchers now endorse this change.We restrict our recommendation to claims of discovery of new effects. We do not address the appropriate threshold for confirmatory or contradictory replications of existing claims. We also do not advocate changes to discovery thresholds in fields that have already adopted more stringent standards (for example, genomics and high-energy physics research; see the 'Potential objections' section below).We also restrict our recommendation to studies that conduct null hypothesis significance tests. We have diverse views about how best to improve reproducibility, and many of us believe that other ways of summarizing the data, such as Bayes factors or other posterior summaries based on clearly articulated model assumptions, are preferable to P values. However, changing the P value threshold is simple, aligns with the training undertaken by many researchers, and might quickly achieve broad acceptance.

Zellner's g-prior remains a popular conventional prior for use in Bayesian variable selection, despite several undesirable consistency issues. In this paper, we study mixtures of g-priors as an alternative to default g-priors that resolve many of the problems with the original formulation, while maintaining the computational tractability that has made the g-prior so popular. We present theoretical properties of the mixture g-priors and provide real and simulated examples to compare the mixture formulation with fixed g-priors, Empirical Bayes approaches and other default procedures.

Often the goal of model selection is to choose a model for future prediction, and it is natural to measure the accuracy of a future prediction by squared error loss. Under the Bayesian approach, it is commonly perceived that the optimal predictive model is the model with highest posterior probability, but this is not necessarily the case. In this paper we show that, for selection among normal linear models, the optimal predictive model is often the median probability model, which is defined as the model consisting of those variables which have overall posterior probability greater than or equal to 1/2 of being in a model. The median probability model often differs from the highest probability model