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This article reviews the current state of the regulatory focus literature as it relates to consumer behavior, with a special emphasis on the goal pursuit processes that naturally align with the promotion and prevention systems. Because most research on such processes has taken place within the framework of regulatory fit theory, we highlight regulatory fit findings. We also suggest practical implications of these goal pursuit processes for marketing and branding. We then shift our attention to the standards that people use to evaluate their goal pursuit processes and examine how these standards and their use might differ with respect to regulatory focus. Finally, we share a new line of work on regulatory focus-specific goal pursuit processes and describe avenues for future research. K E Y W O R D Sgoals and motivation, preference and choice, self-regulation and self-control

This chapter explores the motivational dynamics of the promotion and prevention systems outlined in regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997). It includes a review of the core tenets of the theory—identifying and responding to important and frequently asked questions—in discussing significant research of the past two decades since the theory made its debut. In particular, the chapter includes a discussion of what defines each system, how regulatory focus orientations are commonly measured and manipulated, what differentiates promotion and prevention motivation from approach and avoidance motivation, what characterizes the trade-offs of each system, and newer developments in research on regulatory fit, group dynamics, and motivational flexibility. Throughout, avenues for future research are suggested.

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For over a decade, moral psychologists have been actively researching the processes underlying moral judgments that are made intuitively without reference to an action’s concrete harms or injustice, such as the well-known case of non-procreative, consensual incest. We suggest that the reason some judge this scenario as wrong (using intuitive feelings) and others do not (using deliberative reasons) is due to an important motivational distinction. Consistent with this view, across seven studies, we demonstrate that negative judgments of such intuitive moral scenarios are more intense when processed in the promotion focus compared to the prevention focus, and that this is due to differences in whether eager (intuitive) versus vigilant (deliberative) means are employed in judging these moral wrongs. By examining various boundary conditions for this phenomenon and foundations for these judgments, we learn about the overall differences between promotion and prevention regarding how proscriptive judgments are processed, and begin to integrate these differences with existing theories in moral psychology.

Prevention-focused individuals are motivated to maintain the status quo. Given this, we predicted that individuals with a strong prevention focus, either as a chronic predisposition or situationally induced, would treat their initial decision of how to behave on a first task as the status quo, and thus be motivated to repeat that decision on a subsequent task—even for decisions that are ethically questionable. Five studies supported this prediction in multiple ethical domains: whether or not to overstate performance (Studies 1, 2a, 2b), to disclose disadvantageous facts (Study 3), and to pledge a donation (Study 4). The prevention-repetition effect was observed when initial and subsequent decisions were in the same domain (Studies 1-3) and in different domains (Study 4). Alternative accounts such as justification for the initial decision and preference for consistency were ruled out (Study 2b).

Researchers' interest in the psychology of ethics has increased dramatically in the last 20 years. Because of the influence of "modern" moral philosophy on psychology, what has received most attention, and has even been taken by some to be an essential characteristic of morality, are oughts (i.e., duties and obligations). Consistent with some more recent advances in the psychological literature (and contemporary philosophy), we propose that this is not the only approach to moral value. Using regulatory focus theory as a lens, we suggest that more attention should also be paid to an important motivational alternative-ethical ideals (i.e. advances and aspirations). We review evidence that we believe supports the conclusion that ethics consists of (at least) 2 evaluative systems-not only a system of oughts that is concerned with maintaining obligations, but also a system of ideals that is concerned with attaining virtues.

Depression and generalized anxiety, separately and as comorbid states, continue to represent a significant public health challenge. Current cognitive-behavioral treatments are clearly beneficial but there remains a need for continued development of complementary interventions. This manuscript presents two proof-of-concept studies, in analog samples, of “microinterventions” derived from regulatory focus and regulatory fit theories and targeting dysphoric and anxious symptoms. In Study 1, participants with varying levels of dysphoric and/or anxious mood were exposed to a brief intervention either to increase or to reduce engagement in personal goal pursuit, under the hypothesis that dysphoria indicates under-engagement of the promotion system whereas anxiety indicates over-engagement of the prevention system. In Study 2, participants with varying levels of dysphoric and/or anxious mood received brief training in counterfactual thinking, under the hypothesis that inducing individuals in a state of promotion failure to generate subtractive counterfactuals for past failures (a non-fit) will lessen their dejection/depression-related symptoms, whereas inducing individuals in a state of prevention failure to generate additive counterfactuals for past failures (a non-fit) will lessen their agitation/anxiety-related symptoms. In both studies, we observed discriminant patterns of reduction in distress consistent with the hypothesized links between dysfunctional states of the two motivational systems and dysphoric versus anxious symptoms.