This paper addresses doubts concerning the reliability of knowledge being created by double loop learning processes. Popper's ontological worlds are used to explore the philosophical basis of the way that individual experiences are turned into organisational knowledge, and such knowledge is used to generate organisational learning. The paper suggests that double loop learning may frequently create mistakes and fail to detect possible interesting lines of thought. Popper's work is used to suggest some solutions and an elaboration of the double loop learning process, but ultimately effective organisational learning is shown to depend on the undertaking of an epistemological burden by individuals above and beyond what is usually explicated in prescriptions for learning organisation and knowledge management.
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) plans to develop optical communication terminals for future spacecraft, especially in support of high data rate science missions and manned exploration of Mars. Future, very long-range missions, such as the Realistic Interstellar Explorer (RISE) 1 , will need optical downlink communications to enable even very low data rates. For all of these applications, very fine pointing and tracking is also required, with accuracies on the order of ± 1 µrad or less and peak-to-peak ranges of ± 10 mrad or more. For these applications, it will also be necessary to implement very compact, lightweight and low-power precision beam-steering technologies. Although current commercial-off-the-shelf devices, such as macro-scale piezo-driven tip/tilt actuators exist, which approach mission requirements, they are too large, heavy, and power consuming for projected spacecraft mass and power budgets. The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL) has adopted a different approach to beam-steering in collaboration with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). We are testing and planning to eventually package a highly accurate large dynamic range meso-scale position transducer under development at NIST. In this paper we will describe a generic package design of an optical communications terminal incorporating the NIST prototype beam-steerer. We will also show test results comparing the performance of the NIST prototype meso-scale position beam-steerer to a commercial macro-tip/tilt actuator using a quad-cell tracking sensor.
Amongst those views sometimes attributed to the later Wittgenstein are included both a deflationary theory of truth, as well as a non-factualism about certain regions of discourse. Evidence in favor of the former attribution, it is thought, can be found in Wittgenstein's apparent affirmation of the basic definitional equivalence of 'p' is true and p in x136 of his Philosophical Investigations. Evidence in favor of the latter attribution, it might then be presumed, can be found in the context of the so-called 'private language argument', wherein Wittgenstein provides an expressivist treatment of first-person present tense sensation utterances. In this paper, by contrast, I will argue that Wittgenstein's later philosophy is best understood as endorsing neither a non-factualism about sensation utterances, nor a deflationism about truth. Wittgenstein should instead be understood as offering a 'mixed' view of sensation utterances according to which some while not others are apt for expressivist treatment. Moreover, he should be thought of as identifying truth-conditions with semantic 'correctness-conditions', and thus truth with semantic 'assertibility'.
Recent years have seen a resurgence of scholarly interest in the precise nature of Wittgenstein's fateful but notoriously obscure criticisms of Russell's multiple relation theory of judgment, levelled as Russell was furiously composing Theory of Knowledgez in May-June 1913. In this paper, I place special expository focus on two controversial documents from the relevant period, whose nature and interrelationships to this point have been inadequately understood in the literature. The Wrst document is a set of working notes composed by Russell under the title "Props"z-zwhich I date as on or shortly after 26 Mayz-zwhile the second is a June 1913 letter from Wittgenstein to Russell, often thought to contain a "paralyzing", if mysterious, objection to Russell's theory. On the basis of a new interpretation of these two documents and their relationship, I revise the "standard reading" of Wittgenstein's criticisms. The revision renders that reading invulnerable to certain seemingly devastating criticisms developed by Stevens in 2003. I defend my revised reading against various "non-standard" alternatives which have Xourished in the recent literature, in part as the result of Stevens' criticisms."I am very sorry to hear that my objection to your theory of judgment paralyses you."ww(Wittgenstein to Russell,
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