On "Props", Wittgenstein's June 1913 Letter, and Russell's "Paralysis"

Connelly, James

doi:10.15173/russell.v31i2.2213

Cited by 3 publications

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“…When I wish to refer indifferently to both, I will use 'TLP. ' 2 For more detailed discussion of the scholarly controversy concerning Wittgenstein's objections and their effects on Russell, see Connelly (2011Connelly ( -12, 2014Connelly ( , 2015), Pincock (2008), Hanks (2007), and Stevens (2003Stevens ( , 2004.…”

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confidence: 99%

On Wittgenstein's transcendental deductions

Connelly¹

2017

Belgrade Philosop Ann

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In this paper, I aim to shed light on the use of transcendental deductions, within demonstrations of aspects of Wittgenstein's early semantics, metaphysics, and philosophy of mathematics. I focus on two crucial claims introduced by Wittgenstein within these transcendental deductions, each identified in conversation with Desmond Lee in 1930-31. Specifically, the claims are of the logical independence of elementary propositions, and that infinity is a number. I show how these two, crucial claims are both demonstrated and subsequently deployed by Wittgenstein within a series of transcendental deductions, a series which begins with extensionalism as a generalized condition of sense on propositions, and in the context of which are then derived various, further, significant and unobvious presuppositions generated by that generalized condition of sense. In addition to clearing up deductions of these two, aforementioned claims, I also elucidate deductions of the subsistence of objects, and of logical space as an infinite totality.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On Wittgenstein's transcendental deductions

Connelly¹

2017

Belgrade Philosop Ann

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“…Due to space limitations, I am unfortunately unable to subject Hank's and Pincock's alternative readings to critical scrutiny in this context. However, I have critically considered their views on this topic in detail elsewhere (Connelly, 2011–2012). …”

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“…For a more detailed response to Stevens' critique of the standard reading, see my paper (Connelly, 2011–2012). …”

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Russell and Wittgenstein on Logical Form and Judgement: What did Wittgenstein Try that Wouldn't Work?

Connelly

2013

Theoria

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In this article, I pay special expository attention to two pieces of philosophically relevant Wittgenstein–Russell correspondence from the period leading up to the ultimate demise of Russell's Theory of Knowledge manuscript (in June 1913). This is done in the hopes of shedding light on Wittgenstein's notoriously obscure criticisms of Russell's multiple relation theory of judgement. I argue that these two pieces of correspondence (the first, a letter from Wittgenstein to Russell dated January 1913, and the second, a letter from Russell to Ottoline Morrell, reporting a tense confrontation with Wittgenstein on 26 May 1913) each refer to what is more or less the same approach to problems concerning the unity and well‐formedness of propositions or judgements. However, the view advanced in Wittgenstein's January letter to Russell nevertheless differs in a key respect from the view of Russell's referred to in the May letter to Morrell. The difference involves Wittgenstein's incorporating qualities and relations as unsaturated parts of the copulae of atomic complexes, where these copulae are in turn conceived as logical forms. Because such an approach to logical form (and more specifically, to relations) was philosophically unpalatable to Russell, he undertook an alternative theoretical correction in the context of his 1913 Theory of Knowledge manuscript. This theoretical correction was discussed with Wittgenstein during the tense confrontation on 26 May, and involved deploying a supplemental significance constraint on judgements. It was this significance constraint on judgements, moreover, which was the ‘premiss’ alluded to by Wittgenstein in the context of a June 1913 letter to Russell, wherein he claims to express his objection to Russell's theory ‘exactly.’

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Logical Form and the Unity of the Proposition

Bartmann

2021

Wittgenstein’s Metametaphysics and the Realism-Idealism Debate

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On "Props", Wittgenstein's June 1913 Letter, and Russell's "Paralysis"

Cited by 3 publications

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On Wittgenstein's transcendental deductions

On Wittgenstein's transcendental deductions

Russell and Wittgenstein on Logical Form and Judgement: What did Wittgenstein Try that Wouldn't Work?

Logical Form and the Unity of the Proposition

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