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Since Chester I. Barnard wrote The Functions of the Executive in 1938 numerous authors have cited his many ideas about organizational and individual behavior. Barnard believed that an individual's willingness to cooperate and function within an organization related to his or her "zone of indifference," and the amount of authority the individual was willing to grant to a superior. Barnard's ideas concerning the zone of indifference are related in this article to "Stages of Moral Development" as measured by protocols developed by Lawrence Kohlberg.

This article explores the way public‐sector financial managers cope with ethical challenges created by undue political pressure and demands for special treatment. A nationwide survey of financial managers revealed that fiscal stress exacerbates ethical pressure for most financial managers, including chief financial officers (CFOs) and those who report to CFOs. Financial managers do not work in an ethical vacuum; they respond to supervisors who encourage ethical action and to coworkers who demonstrate high standards of personal integrity. Supervisors of CFOs who emphasize political responsiveness in employee evaluations can threaten the ethical behavior of CFOs, while timely feedback can mitigate ethical pressure. In turn, CFOs as supervisors can temper the harsh work environment in fiscally stressed times by encouraging ethical action and by giving adequate feedback to those who report to them.

This exploratory study examines the effects of a supervisory emphasis on ethical guidance versus political responsiveness in a sample of public finance employees. Supervisors can encourage employees to act both ethically and responsively, or they can emphasize political responsiveness without setting ethical limits. Employees' perceptions of the resulting balance affects their decision-making and their attitudes toward their job. Supervisors set the ethical tone in organizations.Ethical behavior dominates public organization issues today. Recent actions on the part of highly visible leaders, including presidents, governors, senators, corporate executives, financial managers, accountants, stock analysts, and investment bankers, have spurred concerns about ethical management.

This paper presents a model of government saving in order to examine several questions regarding the personal and professional saving preferences or inclinations of a national sample of local government finance managers. First, is personal propensity to save related to a preference for local government saving? Second, is personal propensity to spend related to the finance managers' opinions about their local government's spending? Third, what are the determinants of finance managers' propensity to save or spend, both personally and for their local government? Results confirm that finance managers have a personal propensity to save and a positive view toward local government saving. The opposite, propensity to spend, is also influenced by personal preference. Determinants of these behaviors are explored.

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