We use elections data in which a large number of ties in vote counts between candidates are resolved via a lottery to study the personal incumbency advantage. We benchmark non‐experimental regression discontinuity design (RDD) estimates against the estimate produced by this experiment that takes place exactly at the cutoff. The experimental estimate suggests that there is no personal incumbency advantage. In contrast, conventional local polynomial RDD estimates suggest a moderate and statistically significant effect. Bias‐corrected RDD estimates that apply robust inference are, however, in line with the experimental estimate. Therefore, state‐of‐the‐art implementation of RDD can meet the replication standard in the context of close elections.

This paper studies the effect of candidates' personal vote ranks on promotions to political power in an open list proportional representation system. Using a regression discontinuity design and data from Finnish local elections, we find that ranking first within a party enhances a politician's chances of getting promoted to the position of a municipal board chair, the most important task in Finnish local politics. Other ranks matter less. We document that the effect of ranking first is larger when there is less within-party competition, but the role of external competition is ambiguous. Our evidence suggests that the mechanism behind the rank effects is primarily unrelated to electoral incentives but rather to party-specific norms or political culture. Ranks seem to be, however, only a complement to other promotion criteria such as politicians' previous political experience or how close to the party lines their policy positions stand.

University students have been particularly affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. We present results from the first wave of the Global COVID-19 Student Survey, which was administered at 28 universities in the United States,

We analyze the effect of municipal employees' political representation in municipal councils on local public spending. We use within-party, as-good-as random variation in close elections in the Finnish open-list proportional election system to quantify the effect. One more councilor employed by the public sector increases spending by about one percent. The effect comes largely through the largest party and is specific to the employment sector of the municipal employee. The results are consistent with public employees having an information advantage over other politicians, and thus, being able to influence policy.

We analyze the effect of municipal employees' political representation in municipal councils on local public spending. We use within-party, as-good-as random variation in close elections in the Finnish open-list proportional election system to quantify the effect. One more councilor employed by the public sector increases spending by about one percent. The effect comes largely through the largest party and is specific to the employment sector of the municipal employee. The results are consistent with public employees having an information advantage over other politicians, and thus, being able to influence policy.

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This paper employs newly-collected historical data from Finland to present evidence of historically contingent, long-run consequences of a famine. We document high levels of local inequality in terms of income and land distribution until a violent uprising in 1918. These inequalities partly originated from the famine of 1866–1868 which increased the concentration of land and power to large landowners. We further show that regions with more exposure to the famine had more labor coercion by the early 1900s. These inner tensions led to violent conflict following the Russian Revolution and the Finnish independence from the Russian Empire. Using micro-data on all the casualties of the 1918 Finnish Civil War, we demonstrate that the famine plausibly contributed to local insurgency participation through these factors. Although unsuccessful in replacing the government, the insurgency led to significant policy changes, including radical land redistribution and a full extension of the franchise. These national reforms led to a more drastic shift towards equality in locations more affected by the famine with greater pre-conflict inequality. Our findings highlight how historical shocks can have large and long-lasting, but not straightforward impacts.