This paper analyzes and compares the incentive properties of some common payment mechanisms for GPs, namely fee for service (FFS), capitation and fundholding. It focuses on gatekeeping GPs and it specifically recognizes GPs heterogeneity in both ability and altruism. It also allows inappropriate care by GPs to lead to more serious illnesses. The results are as follows. Capitation is the payment mechanism that induces the most referrals to expensive specialty care. Fundholding may induce almost as much referrals as capitation when the expected costs of GPs care are high relative to those of specialty care. Although driven by financial incentives of different nature, the strategic behaviors associated with fundholding and FFS are very much alike. Finally, whether a regulator should use one or another payment mechanism for GPs will depend on (i) his priorities (either cost-containment or quality enhancement) which, in turn, depend on the expected cost difference between GPs care and specialty care, and (ii) the distribution of profiles (diagnostic ability and altruism levels) among GPs.

In this paper we investigate the implications of permitting parallel imports of pharmaceuticals produced by a monopoly, from one country to another. We use a model where countries differ in the patients' level of co-payment for buying pharmaceuticals, and patients differ in the utility obtained from the consumption of pharmaceuticals. We show that the effects of parallel imports on total welfare are as follows: On the one hand, when countries differ in their health system only, parallel imports decrease total welfare; On the other hand, when countries differ in the health needs of their patients only, parallel imports enhance total welfare.

This paper analyzes the timing decisions of pharmaceutical firms to launch a new drug in countries involved in international reference pricing. We show three important features of launch timing when all countries refer to the prices in all other countries and in all previous periods of time. First, there is no withdrawal of drugs in any country and in any period of time. Second, whenever the drug is sold in a country, it is also sold in all countries with larger willingness to pay. Third, there is no strict incentive to delay the launch of a drug in any country. We then show that the first and third results continue to hold when the countries only refer to the prices of a subset of all countries in a transitive way and in any period of time. We also show that the second result continues to hold when the reference is on the last period prices only. Last, we show that the seller's profits increase as the sets of reference countries decrease with respect to inclusion.