International audienceThis paper employs the theory of equality of opportunity, described in Roemer's book (Equality of Opportunity, Harvard University Press, 1998), to compute the extent to which tax-and-transfer regimes in 11 countries equalize opportunities among citizens for income acquisition. Roughly speaking, equality of opportunity for incomes has been achieved in a country when it is the case that the distributions of post-fisc income are the same for different types of citizen, where a citizen's type is defined by the socioeconomic status of his parents. Intuitively, a country will have equalized opportunity if the chances of earning high (or low) income are equal for citizens from all family backgrounds. Of course, pre-fisc income distributions, by type, will not be identical, as long as the educational system does not entirely make up for the disadvantage that children, who come from poor families face, but the tax-and-transfer system can play a role in rectifying that inequality. We include, in our computation, two numbers that summarize the extent to which each country's current fiscal regime achieves equalization of opportunities for income, and the deadweight loss that would be incurred by moving to the regime that does.

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Most poverty studies build on measures that take account of recurring incomes from sources such as labour or social transfers. However, other financial resources such as savings and assets also affect living standards, often in very significant ways. Previous studies that have sought to incorporate assets into poverty measures suggest that (1) poverty estimates including wealth are considerably lower than income-based measures; (2) poverty rates of the elderly are more affected than those of the nonelderly and (3) poverty rates are especially affected by the household's main residence. This paper assesses the sensitivity of these conclusions to various plausible alternative assumptions, such as the poverty line calculation, the types of assets included in the wealth concept and choices with respect to the equivalence scale. Moreover, we check whether the impact of alternative assumptions is consistent across age and institutional settings. To that effect we compare Belgium and Germany, two countries with similar living standards and income poverty rates, but very different levels and distributions of wealth. Using data from the HFCS we show that accounting for wealth affects the incidence and age structure of poverty in a very substantial way. Country comparisons are also affected in very substantial ways. Terms of use: Documents in D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E S Estimation of JointJEL Classification: I32

The crisis has deepened pre-existing concerns regarding low-wage and non-standard employment. Countries where unemployment increased most strongly during the crisis period also saw part-time employment increasing, particularly involuntary part-time work. With involuntary part-time workers, as a particular group of underemployed, facing especially high poverty rates, this was accompanied by an increase, on average, in the poverty risk associated with working part-time. However, this was not reflected in a marked increase in the overall in-work poverty rate because full-time work remains dominant and its poverty risk did not change markedly. The household context is of the essence when considering policy implications.JEL codes: I32, I38, J21, J22, J68, R28

The optimal design of redistributive systems continues to be matter of considerable academic and public debate, with the optimal extent and intensity of pro-poor targeting remaining a key issue of contention. This article shows, first, that the overall relationship between pro-poor targeting and income inequality reduction is very weak. Although occasionally the association is positive, it is not robust, very weak, and effectively zero with various reasonable methodological decisions. Secondly, and more importantly, a detailed disaggregated analysis reveals that the most redistributive systems do contain subsystems that are strongly targeted to the poor by intent and by design. Thirdly, we also show that a disaggregation over the function of social transfers is very relevant: old age benefits are an important driver of the weak overall association, while for family benefits we find a positive relationship. Absolutely key, however, is our finding that means-tested systems play a crucial role in bringing about redistributive effectiveness, even if their relative size is small. We thus shed new light on the politics of targeting. While it remains important that broad sections of the electorate benefit from social transfers, strong pro-targeting within such a context is possible and indeed essential for real redistributive impact. Benefits for the poor need not be poor benefits if and when these are embedded in benefit systems that meet wider redistributive needs and rationales.

When the 2008 crisis hit, social safety nets in Europe were not in the best of shape. This article examines what, if anything, governments did to adjust minimum income protection after two decades of relative neglect. In view of the hardship brought on by the crisis, this question is of importance in itself. In addition, there is a long-standing interest in the role crises play in re-shaping policies, possibly in a radical way. Building on purpose-collected data for twenty-four European countries, this article shows that many countries introduced supportive measures during the first years of the crisis, particularly in the form of additional benefit increases and more generous child benefits. Behavioural requirements imposed on minimum income recipients were not relaxed but in some countries activation efforts were intensified. Although the evidence shows that the crisis did trigger a response, there is little evidence for a structural change of course towards more adequate safety nets.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.

The exceptionally high union density rates in Denmark, Finland and Sweden are attributed to a particular form of voluntary unemployment insurance, known as the Ghent system. Heavily subsidized by the state and administered by union funds, it strongly motivates workers to become union members. Belgium has a partial Ghent system: while unemployment insurance is compulsory, trade unions retain an important role in the provision of benefits. Belgian union density is at an intermediate level; but as in other Ghent countries, its level is currently higher than in the 1970s. This article argues that the Belgian institutional set-up provides stronger incentives for manual workers in industry with lower educational attainment and a past unemployment record. In Denmark, Finland and Sweden, the Ghent system recruits workers across different occupations and educational levels. However, its appeal seems to have lessened over recent years, particularly among younger workers.