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This article evaluates the influence of welfare state policy on individual social volunteering. Unlike previous studies that have investigated the relationship between the welfare state and civic engagement, this contribution focuses on those areas of civil society that are most directly related to public welfare state activities. Moreover, it is assumed that welfare state policy does not uniformly affect the civic engagement of various social groups. The analyses provide support for the crowding out hypothesis: individual social volunteering is lower in extensive welfare states than it is in countries that spend less on welfare state policy. However, when group‐specific welfare state effects are modelled, it is revealed that the crowding out effect of public social services does not hold for the low‐income group. Additionally, extensive welfare policy reduces the negative effect of low affluence on social volunteering. Crowding out and crowding in thus go hand in hand: while state activities indeed serve as a substitute for social volunteering in some places, in others they are found to have a stimulating effect.

This article evaluates the influence of different models of democracy on individual volunteering in associations and organizations. More precisely, we investigate the extent to which the degree of liberal and participatory conceptions of democracy respectively shapes the conditions under which voluntary engagement thrives. We apply multilevel analysis-a method that corresponds well to the central hypothesis of institutional approaches and is most suitable for modeling the relationship between the democratic context and individual volunteering. We show that both a representative conception of democracy, as well as strong direct democracy, leads to advantageous conditions for civic engagement. In contrast, if the two models of democracy are combined, the two different logics of the democratic process disturb one another, resulting in less voluntary engagement.

This paper evaluates whether direct democracy supplements or undermines traditional representative democracy. While a first approach assumes that a culture of active direct democracy stimulates citizens' political interest and ultimately bolsters participation in parliamentary elections, a competing hypothesis proposes a negative relationship between the frequency of ballot measures and electoral participation due to voter fatigue and decreased significance of elections. Our multilevel analysis of the 26 Swiss cantons challenges recent studies conducted for the U.S. states: In the Swiss context, where direct democracy is more important in the political process than the less salient parliamentary elections, greater use of direct democratic procedures is associated with a lower individual probability to participate in elections. Furthermore, by distinguishing between short and long-term effects of direct democracy, we show that the relationship observed is of a long-term nature and can therefore be seen as a result of adaptive learning processes rather than of instantaneous voter fatigue.

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Whereas ecological economists argue strongly in favor of incentive-based approaches to promote renewable energy sources and reduce energy consumption, those instruments have been shown to be particularly difficult to implement politically. We begin with a recognition that cost perceptions that inherently characterize incentive-based policy instruments are a fundamental reason for their unpopularity. We therefore argue that the crucial question that policymakers need to address is how the benefit-cost ratios of incentive-based instruments can be altered in ways such that their inherent costs become acceptable. By focusing on the various features of these instruments, we propose three strategies for answering this question theoretically: objectively reduce the costs, reduce the visibility of the costs, and identify compensation strategies, i.e., strengthen the benefit side of the equation. Based on a conjoint analysis for Switzerland, our results demonstrate that reducing objective and perceived costs may indeed strengthen support for incentive-based policy instruments, whereas cost compensation does not seem to work as well. We show, moreover, that the latter can be explained by the fact that substantial numbers of voters do not understand or are not convinced by the commonly proposed mechanism of environmental taxes. Given that voters do not believe in the usefulness and efficacy of incentivebased policy measures, no cost compensation is feasible.