Emotional memories are vivid and lasting but not necessarily accurate. Under some conditions, emotion even increases people's susceptibility to false memories. This review addresses when and why emotion leaves people vulnerable to misremembering events. Recent research suggests that pregoal emotions-those experienced before goal attainment or failure (e.g., hope, fear)-narrow the scope of people's attention to information that is central to their goals. This narrow focus can impair memory for peripheral details, leaving people vulnerable to misinformation concerning those details. In contrast, postgoal emotions-those experienced after goal attainment or failure (e.g., happiness, sadness)-broaden the scope of attention leaving people more resistant to misinformation. Implications for legal contexts, such as emotion-related errors in eyewitness testimony, are discussed.

Research has shown that emotional events are remembered better than neutral events, but might also elicit an increase in false memories. The present study was designed to disentangle the influences of valence and arousal on event memory in the misinformation paradigm. Participants were shown six types of photographs (positive with high/low arousal, negative with high/low arousal, ambiguous, neutral), after which half of them were exposed to misleading information. A recognition test assessed memory for both correct and false central and peripheral details. Negative and ambiguous events elicited fewer correct and more false memories for peripheral details than positive and neutral events, regardless of previous exposure to misinformation. Arousal improved memory for correct central details, and both negative valence and arousal inhibited control participants' tendency to endorse false central details. The power of emotion was overruled by the power of suggestion, however, as the latter effect disappeared with previous exposure to misinformation. Results are discussed in the light of earlier research on emotion and cognition, recent motivational theories, and implications for forensic practice.

Recent studies regarding the effect of mood on the DRM (Deese-Roediger-McDermott) illusion have not been able to clearly establish yet whether valence or arousal is most critical in determining susceptibility to false memories, nor what the underlying processes are. In three experiments, both the valence and the level of arousal of participants' mood were manipulated. Six conditions were used: positive mood with high/low arousal, negative mood with high/low arousal, neutral mood, and a control condition. Memory was tested by means of immediate and delayed recognition and immediate free recall. The mood induction procedure was effective. For recognition memory, there was an effect of arousal on the endorsement of critical lures. Low-arousal moods elicited more false recognition than high-arousal moods, regardless of valence. Based on signal detection analyses, the effect was attributed to more liberal response criteria with low arousal, in combination with a tendency towards improved item-specific memory with high arousal.

Recent studies with the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm have revealed that Korsakoff patients show reduced levels of false recognition and different patterns of false recall compared to controls. The present experiment examined whether this could be attributed to an encoding deficit, or rather to problems with explicitly retrieving thematic information at test. In a variation on the DRM paradigm, both patients and controls were presented with associative as well as categorised word lists, with the order of recall and recognition tests manipulated between-subjects. The results point to an important role for the automatic/controlled retrieval distinction: Korsakoff patients' false memory was only diminished compared to controls' when automatic or short-term memory processes could not be used to fulfil the task at hand. Hence, the patients' explicit retrieval deficit appears to be crucial in explaining past and present data. Results are discussed in terms of fuzzy-trace and activation-monitoring theories.

Following the distinction between involuntary unconscious memory, involuntary conscious memory, and intentional retrieval, the focus of the present paper is whether there is an impairment of involuntary conscious memory among Korsakoff patients. At study, participants generated associations versus counted the number of letters with enclosed spaces or the number of vowels in the target words (semantic versus perceptual processing). In the Direct tests, stems were to be used to retrieve the targets with either guessing or no guessing allowed; in the Opposition tests, the stems were to be completed with the first word that came to mind but using another word if that first word was a target word; and in the Indirect tests, no reference was made to the target words from the study phase. In the Direct tests, the performance of Korsakoff patients was not necessarily worse than the one of healthy controls, provided guessing was allowed. More critical for the Korsakoff patients was the deficient involuntary conscious memory. The deficiency explained the suppression failures in the Opposition tests, the absence of performance differences between the Indirect and Opposition tests, the absence of a beneficial effect in providing information about the status of the stem, the performance boost when allowed to guess, and the very low rate of "Know"/"Remember" responses.