Elaborating on misleading information concerning emotional events can lead people to form false memories. The present experiment compared participants' susceptibility to false memories when they elaborated on information associated with positive versus negative emotion and pregoal versus postgoal emotion. Pregoal emotion reflects appraisals that goal attainment or failure is anticipated but has not yet occurred (e.g., hope and fear). Postgoal emotion reflects appraisals that goal attainment or failure has already occurred (e.g., happiness and devastation). Participants watched a slideshow depicting an interaction between a couple and were asked to empathise with the protagonist's feelings of hope (positive pregoal), happiness (positive postgoal), fear (negative pregoal), or devastation (negative postgoal); in control conditions, no emotion was mentioned. Participants were then asked to reflect on details of the interaction that had occurred (true) or had not occurred (false), and that were relevant or irrelevant to the protagonist's goal. Irrespective of emotional valence, participants in the pregoal conditions were more susceptible to false memories concerning goal-irrelevant details than were participants in the other conditions. These findings support the view that pregoal emotions narrow attention to information relevant to goal pursuit, increasing susceptibility to false memories for irrelevant information.
ARTICLE HISTORYReceived 6 September 2015 Accepted 27 January 2016 KEYWORDS False memory; emotion; misinformation; motivation; valence; goal-relevance Memory can be surprisingly inaccurate. People forget, are vulnerable to memory distortion, and can even be led to recall events that never happened (e.g., Schacter, 2001). A well-known method for examining the malleability of memory is the misinformation paradigm (e.g., Loftus, 2005). After an event occurs, people who are exposed to misleading suggestions about what occurred often incorporate these suggestions into their accounts of the original event (e.g., Frenda, Nichols, & Loftus, 2011;Loftus, 1979;Okado & Stark, 2005). The resulting "false" memories have been explained by source misattribution (e.g., Ayers & Reder, 1998;Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993): over time, people forget the source of the misinformation and mistakenly attribute it to the event. Studies concerning false memories have great scope and significance. They not only provide basic insights into the process of remembering, but also have major implications for both forensic and clinical practice (e.g., Kaplan, Van Damme, Levine, & Loftus, 2016;McNally, 2003;Schacter & Loftus, 2013).False memories elicited by the misinformation paradigm illustrate the power of suggestion and people's tendency to integrate bits of information encountered at various times into a cohesive memory. Other research has demonstrated the power of imagination to alter memory (see Loftus & Bernstein, 2005, for a review). Rich false memories of having been lost in a shopping mall (Loftus & Pickrell, 1995)...