Three studies are conducted to assess the uncertainty- threat model of political conservatism, which posits that psychological needs to manage uncertainty and threat are associated with political orientation. Results from structural equation models provide consistent support for the hypothesis that uncertainty avoidance (e.g., need for order, intolerance of ambiguity, and lack of openness to experience) and threat management (e.g., death anxiety, system threat, and perceptions of a dangerous world) each contributes independently to conservatism (vs. liberalism). No support is obtained for alternative models, which predict that uncertainty and threat management are associated with ideological extremism or extreme forms of conservatism only. Study 3 also reveals that resistance to change fully mediates the association between uncertainty avoidance and conservatism, whereas opposition to equality partially mediates the association between threat and conservatism. Implications for understanding the epistemic and existential bases of political orientation are discussed.

According to previous research conducted mainly in the United States, psychological needs pertaining to the management of uncertainty and threat predict right-wing conservatism, operationally defined in terms of resistance to change and acceptance of inequality. In this study, we analyze data from 19 countries included in the European Social Survey (ESS) to assess two sets of hypotheses: (1) that traditionalism (an aspect of resistance to change) and acceptance of inequality would be positively associated with right (versus left) orientation, and (2) that rule-following (an aspect of the need for order), high need for security, and low need for openness to experience would be associated with right (versus left) orientation, adjusting for quadratic effects associated with ideological extremity. In addition, we determine the extent to which the pattern of relations among needs, values, and political orientation was similar in Eastern and Western European contexts. Results from regression and structural equation models indicate that traditionalism and, to a lesser extent, rule-following predict right-wing conservatism in both regions, whereas acceptance of inequality predicts right-wing orientation in the West only. Although openness to experience was associated with preferences for greater HULDA THORISDOTTIR doctoral student, JOHN T.

In this article we synthesize theory and research from several areas of psychology and political science to propose and test a causal model of the effects of threat on political attitudes. Based in part on prior research showing that fear, threat, and anxiety decrease cognitive capacity and motivation, we hypothesize that under high (vs. low) threat, people will seek to curtail open-ended information searches and exhibit motivated closedmindedness (one aspect of the need for cognitive closure). The subjective desire for certainty, control, and closure, in turn, is expected to increase the individual's affinity for political conservatism, insofar as resistance to change and adherence to authority figures and conventional forms of morality are assumed to satisfy these epistemic motives more successfully than their ideological opposites. Consistent with this account, we find in Studies 1a and 1b that putting people into a highly threatened mindset leads them to exhibit an increase in motivated closed-mindedness and to perceive the world as more dangerous. Furthermore, in Study 2 we demonstrate that a subtle threat manipulation increases selfreported conservatism (or decreases self-reported liberalism), and this effect is mediated by closed-mindedness. In Study 3, we manipulated closed-mindedness directly and found that high (vs. low) cognitive load results in a greater affinity for the Republican (vs. Democratic) party. Finally, in Study 4 we conducted an experiment involving political elites in Iceland and found that three different types of threat (to the self, group, and system) all led center-right politicians to score higher on closed-mindedness and issue-based political conservatism. Implications for society and for the theory of ideology as motivated social cognition are discussed.

In the wake of major events, whether these be terrorist attacks 1 , global pandemics such as the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreak 2,3 or presidential elections 4 , conspiracy theories predictably surge across the Internet. Conspiracy theories, defined as beliefs that a group of actors are colluding in secret to reach a malevolent goal 5,6 , are common across times, cultures and populations 7,8 . Accumulating research has revealed that a reliable predictor of belief in one conspiracy theory is belief in another conspiracy theory 1,[9][10][11] . It therefore appears that people differ in their predisposition to explain events as conspiracies, which is sometimes referred to as 'conspiracy mentality' or the 'conspiracy mindset' [12][13][14] . The conspiracy mindset is closely associated with belief in a wide range of existing specific conspiracy theories, as well as the endorsement of conspiracy theories created by researchers for experimental purposes 15 . It differs from concrete conspiracy beliefs in that it taps into the general propensity to suspect that conspiracies are at play, uncontaminated by concrete events, actors or contexts.The political realm in particular is one key area where conspiracy beliefs are salient and thriving 16 . For instance, conspiracy theories are intrinsically connected to the rhetoric of populist political leaders who arguably exploit conspiracy theories for strategic reasons 17,18 . Importantly, citizens' belief in conspiracy theories predicts voting behaviour and intentions 19,20 and non-normative political action 21,22 . Traditionally, conspiracy beliefs have been associated with authoritarian worldviews 23,24 , as exemplified by positive relations between conspiracy beliefs and right-wing authoritarianism [25][26][27] . Stripping a politically right-wing stance from the surplus meaning of authoritarianism (and its strong connection to traditions and authorities), many studies have found a linear relationship between self-reported political orientation and conspiracy endorsement 16,28,29 , suggesting that conspiracy beliefs are more common at the political right than at the political left [30][31][32][33] .However, in contrast to this simple, linear relation, numerous findings point to a curvilinear relation between political orientation

Previous research on system justification theory suggests that beliefs that rationalize inequalities are related to subjective well-being. We examine how "complementary" (hostile and benevolent) justifications of gender inequality may serve a palliative function for both men and women. Using multilevel modeling and data from 32 countries (N's=362 to 5160), we find that relationships between hostile and benevolent justifications and life satisfaction are moderated by the degree of gender inequality at the national level. In relatively egalitarian nations, individuals who endorse "complementary" justifications are higher on life satisfaction compared to those who endorse an exclusively hostile justification. In nations with high gender inequality, there is no difference in life satisfaction for those who endorse exclusively hostile vs. complementary justifications.