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PurposeAs the quality of the environment decreases, enterprises and consumers' awareness of environmental protection is constantly improving. More and more enterprises begin to increase their investment in carbon emission reduction and attract environmentally friendly consumers to buy low-carbon products through advertising. The purpose of this paper is to utilize a realistic differential game model to provide dynamic carbon emission reduction strategies, advertising strategies and cooperation methods for complex supply chain members from a long-term perspective.Design/methodology/approachThis paper uses the extend Vidale-Wolfe model (V-W model) to discuss the dynamic joint emission reduction strategy in the supply chain.Findings(1) When consumers' awareness of environmental protection increases, on the whole, carbon emission reduction and profit of products show an upward trend. (2) From a long-term perspective, the manufacturer's advertising subsidy to one of the retailers is the best choice. If the strength of the two retailers is unbalanced, the manufacturer will choose to cooperate with the dominant retailer. (3) Advertising, as a marketing means for retailers to promote low-carbon products, can alleviate the adverse effects of prisoner's dilemma in a semi-cooperative state, but it cannot achieve the Pareto optimization result.Research limitations/implicationsThis paper focuses on the analysis of the situation that when the manufacturer is the leader and thinks that consumers are active advocates of low-carbon products.Originality/valueThe results of this paper can provide theoretical basis for the joint emission strategy of supply chain members in low-carbon environment.

Under the low-carbon economy environment, downstream retailer advertises upstream manufacturer's reduction to achieve better market performance, which is a common form of cooperation in low-carbon supply chain management. This paper assumes that the market share is dynamically influenced by product emission reduction and the retailer's low-carbon advertising. First, the Vidale–Wolfe model is extended. Second, from the perspective of centralization and decentralization, four differential game models of manufacturer and retailer in the two-level supply chain are constructed, while the optimal equilibrium strategies in various situations are compared. Finally, using Rubinstein bargaining model, the profit obtained by the secondary supply chain system is distributed. The main results are as follows: (1) The unit emission reduction and market share of manufacturer are rising with time. (2) The profit of each member of the secondary supply chain and the whole supply chain is always optimal under the centralized strategy. Although the advertising cost allocation strategy achieves the Pareto optimal under the decentralized situation, it still cannot reach the profit of the centralized strategy. (3) The manufacturer's low-carbon strategy and the retailer's advertising strategy have played a positive role in the secondary supply chain. The profits of the secondary supply chain members and the whole are on the rise. (4) As the leader of the secondary supply chain, it is more dominant in profit distribution. The results can provide theoretical basis for the joint emission strategy of supply chain members in low-carbon environment.