This paper provides the first evidence that value-added education accountability schemes induce dynamic distortions. Extending earlier dynamic moral hazard models, I propose a new test for ratchet effects, showing that classroom inputs are distorted less when schools face a shorter horizon over which they can influence student performance. I then exploit grade span variation using rich educational data to credibly identify the extent of dynamic gaming, finding compelling evidence of ratchet effects based on a triple-differences approach. Further analysis indicates that these effects are driven primarily by effort distortions, with teacher reallocations playing a secondary role.

for excellent research assistance. Remote access to the data for this study was generously provided by the North Carolina Education Research Data Center (NCERDC). All remaining errors are our own. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications.

This paper provides the first evidence that value-added education accountability schemes induce dynamic distortions. Extending earlier dynamic moral hazard models, I propose a new test for ratchet effects, showing that classroom inputs are distorted less when schools face a shorter horizon over which they can influence student performance. I then exploit grade span variation using rich educational data to credibly identify the extent of dynamic gaming, finding compelling evidence of ratchet effects based on a triple-differences approach. Further analysis indicates that these effects are driven primarily by effort distortions, with teacher reallocations playing a secondary role.

for excellent research assistance. Remote access to the data for this study was generously provided by the North Carolina Education Research Data Center (NCERDC). All remaining errors are our own. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications.

We propose an approach for credibly estimating indirect sorting effects of major education reforms and placing them alongside the reforms' direct and persistent effects for the first time. Applying our approach to California's statewide class size reduction program, we estimate a large positive direct effect of smaller classes on test scores and an even larger indirect effect due to demographic changes as private school students switch into public schools; both effects also persist. Accounting for sorting using these estimates raises the program's benefit-cost ratio significantly. Further, our analysis indicates that indirect sorting is likely relevant in policy evaluations more generally.