The Dynamic Effects of Educational Accountability

In this paper, we investigate whether dynamic incentive schemes lead to a ratchet effect in a social dilemma. We test whether subjects strategically restrict their contribution levels at the beginning of a cumulative public goods game in order to avoid high obligations in the future and how this affects efficiency. The incentive schemes prescribe that individual contributions have to be at least as high as, or strictly higher than, contributions in the previous period. We observe a substantial and statistically significant ratchet effect. Participants reduce their public good contribution levels at the beginning of the game, anticipating that higher contributions imply higher minimum contribution levels in the future, which increases the risk of being exploited by freeriders. While the dynamic incentive schemes lead to increasing contribution levels over the course of the game, this increase is not strong enough to compensate the efficiency losses at the beginning.

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“…Macartney (2016) detects ratcheting also in the context of education accountability schemes in a study using field data.…”

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confidence: 99%

The Ratchet Effect in Social Dilemmas

Gallier

Sturm

2020

SSRN Journal

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“…Schoolbased accountability schemes, in contrast, have been found to change educators' actions in ways one would predict based on the incentives embedded in the programs. Proficiency-count systems, for example, have been shown to lead teachers to direct attention to marginal students, as expected (Reback, 2008;Neal and Schanzenbach, 2010;Deming et al, 2016), and growth-based programs can lead to resources being allocated across grades differentially in ways that make target attainment easier (Macartney, 2016).…”

Section: (D) Fifth Gradementioning

confidence: 83%

“…63 For a more detailed discussion of the ABCs, see Macartney (2016). Notes: Summary statistics are calculated for all third through fifth grade student-year observations from 1996-97 to 2004-05.…”

Section: CIII Interpreting the Estimates Of Teacher Ability With Thementioning

confidence: 99%

Teacher Value-Added and Economic Agency

Macartney¹,

McMillan²,

Petronijevic³

2018

Self Cite

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Teacher value-added is not a technological 'primitive.' Instead, it increases within-teacher when accountability incentives are strengthened, as we show. This evidence motivates a framework in which teacher value-added depends on two unobserved inputs to education production: teacher ability and incentive-varying teacher effort. We present a strategy to identify these two inputs and their distinct effects on test scores for the first time, using exogenous incentive policy variation and rich longitudinal data from North Carolina. The estimates indicate that both the ability component of teacher value-added and teacher effort raise current and future scores. We also find that effort responds systematically to incentives, underlining the agency of the teaching force as an important factor in education production. To explore the policy implications of this economic agency, we then use our estimates to compare the cost effectiveness of incentiveoriented education reforms with policies that target teacher ability. Incentive reforms come out ahead in a variety of plausible cases, given their potential to influence all teachers rather than a subset.

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“…For example, Dee, Jacob, Hoxby, and Ladd () found evidence of improvements in 8th‐grade math achievement after standards‐based instruction was implemented, particularly among traditionally low‐achieving groups and at the lower percentiles. More recently, Macartney () presented the first evidence that standards‐based education accountability schemes can be sensitive to short‐term performance gains in addition to the long‐term summative gains typically measured. This study demonstrated that the context of the influence on student performance can significantly impact the validity of the results.…”

Section: Review Of the Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

How Common Is the Common Core? A Global Analysis of Math Teaching and Learning

Khaliqi

2016

School Sci & Mathematics

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The U.S. educational system is undergoing rapid and substantial changes with many states grappling with the adoption of the Common Core State Standards in Mathematics (CCSSM). Important research questions remain unanswered regarding the potential efficacy of the CCSSM to improve student math performance compared with students around the globe. This article utilized TIMSS 2007 8th‐grade math assessment results and curricular frameworks to (1) measure the degree of overlap between the CCSSM and TIMSS standards, and (2) use this finding to create a predictive model to determine the potential efficacy of the CCSSM in improving the U.S. 8th‐grade student math performance compared with six culturally matched, TIMSS‐assessed countries, provinces, and states. Comparisons of CCSSM and TIMSS‐assessed jurisdictions show that the CCSSM holds many items in common with TIMSS‐assessed jurisdictions, but lacks rigor in some key areas. The CCSSM deficiencies include algebraic knowledge and problem solving at the 8th‐grade level, and are a significant detractor from the CCSSM when compared with TIMSS.

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The Dynamic Effects of Educational Accountability

Cited by 14 publications

References 0 publications

The Ratchet Effect in Social Dilemmas

The Ratchet Effect in Social Dilemmas

Teacher Value-Added and Economic Agency

How Common Is the Common Core? A Global Analysis of Math Teaching and Learning

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