This article is about situational crime prevention in the (European) supply chain. It is based on a thorough analysis of two international supply chain security programs, and on the consequent observation that the security measures that form part of these programs can all be classified as situational techniques.One of the main conclusions of the research has been that an 'ex ante' consideration of preventive measures, and a careful consideration of any interdependencies, may prove to be extremely beneficial to the success of future programming. The outcome of these considerations can be applied to rank potential interventions, and decide on the most promising and feasible one(s). In order to facilitate a thorough consideration of the effectiveness, efficiency and acceptability of potential measures, a series of 'success indicators' was developed.

Post 9/11 we have witnessed the introduction and further strengthening of a range of trans-border security programs designed to protect international supply chains against acts of unlawful interference. In some cases compliance with these programs is mandatory. In other cases compliance results in a preferential treatment by appropriate authorities. To a great extent, these programs comprehend the introduction of situational measures. In most instances, however, operators within the supply chain-being made responsible for their actual implementation-are left with limited guidance. In this paper it is argued that a lack of guidance may result in measures being introduced without taking full account of their potential consequences. Based on an analysis of previous research findings and on the outcome of a literature review, direct and indirect implementation costs have been differentiated from a range of (consequential costs provoked by) potential reverse effects, and from a series of generic preconditions, enabling practitioners in industry to conduct a proper cost analysis and come to an informed decision on what particular measure(s) best to implement. It is argued that criminology and management science can support this decision making process, provided that policy makers allow operators a certain freedom of choice between alternative measures and approaches

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Over the past decade -following the disastrous attacks of 9/11 -we have witnessed the introduction of a range of trans-border security programs designed to protect international supply chains against acts of terrorism. In most if not all cases, these programs comprehend the introduction of situational measures, and in many cases operators in the industry are left with limited guidance on how best to implement them. In academic literature on situational crime prevention it is argued that -when introduced without proper reflection and consideration -preventive measures can easily backfire and turn into the negative. It is argued that measures need to be carefully assessed prior to their implementation, and that this assessment should focus on various criteria. In the study reported on in this paper, these observations are illustrated by means of an ex ante consideration of alternative measures to control unauthorised access to pick-up and delivery vans. This study was conducted in 2011 in a Belgian branch of an international express operator, and is limited to the selection process of preventive measures only. The outcome illustrates that -when deciding on what measures best to implement -it may be worthwhile or even necessary not to focus on monetary costs only, but to also take a number of other cost items into consideration; and to make sure that a number of preconditions are in place in order for the introduction of a measure to be feasible and successful. It is argued that an exante consideration of alternative solutions will contribute to making the decision onwhat measures best to implement a more informed and balanced one.

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