Controlling Access to Pick-up and Delivery Vans: The Cost of Alternative Measures

Abstract

Over the past decade -following the disastrous attacks of 9/11 -we have witnessed the introduction of a range of trans-border security programs designed to protect international supply chains against acts of terrorism. In most if not all cases, these programs comprehend the introduction of situational measures, and in many cases operators in the industry are left with limited guidance on how best to implement them. In academic literature on situational crime prevention it is argued that -when introduced without proper reflection and consideration -preventive measures can easily backfire and turn into the negative. It is argued that measures need to be carefully assessed prior to their implementation, and that this assessment should focus on various criteria. In the study reported on in this paper, these observations are illustrated by means of an ex ante consideration of alternative measures to control unauthorised access to pick-up and delivery vans. This study was conducted in 2011 in a Belgian branch of an international express operator, and is limited to the selection process of preventive measures only. The outcome illustrates that -when deciding on what measures best to implement -it may be worthwhile or even necessary not to focus on monetary costs only, but to also take a number of other cost items into consideration; and to make sure that a number of preconditions are in place in order for the introduction of a measure to be feasible and successful. It is argued that an exante consideration of alternative solutions will contribute to making the decision onwhat measures best to implement a more informed and balanced one.

Breaking Silos of Legal and Regulatory Risks to Outperform Traditional Compliance Approaches

“…Also, some of the controls derived from a detailed analysis of risks related to one specific compliance area may prove to be effective for reducing risks in other, seemingly unrelated areas. Physical access controls that are implemented to ensure compliance with dual-use trade regulations, for example, may also serve to reduce the risk of employee theft or the risk of individuals gaining unauthorized access to freight that is considered 'safe to fly' from an air cargo security perspective (see also Haelterman et al 2012). In environmental criminology, this 'spill-over' effect of situational crime prevention measures is commonly referred to as 'diffusion of benefits' (see e.g.…”