In this paper we draw on insights from theories in the management and corporate governance literature to develop a theoretical model that makes explicit the links between a firm's corporate social responsibility (CSR) related board attributes, its board CSR strategy, and its environmental and social performance. We then test the model using structural equation modeling approach.We find that the greater the CSR orientation of the board (as measured by the board's independence, gender diversity, and financial expertise on audit committee), the more proactive and comprehensive the firm's CSR strategy, and the higher its environmental and social performance. Moreover, we find this link to be endogenous and self-reinforcing, with superior CSR performers tending to further strengthen their board CSR orientation.This result while positive is also suggestive of the widening of the gap between the leads and laggards in CSR.Therefore the question arises as to how 'leaders' are using their superior CSR competencies seen by many scholars as a source of corporate (at times unfair) competitive advantage. Stakeholders of corporations therefore need to be cognizant of this aspect of CSR when evaluating a firm's CSR activities. Policy makers also need to be cognizant of these concerns when designing regulation in this field.

We examine the link between a firm's environmental (E) and social (S) disclosures and measures of its risk including total, systematic, and idiosyncratic risk. While we do not find any link between a firm's E and S disclosures and its systematic risk, we find a negative and significant association between these disclosures and a firm's total and idiosyncratic risk. These are novel findings and are consistent with the predictions of the stakeholder theory and the resource based view of the firm suggesting that firms which make extensive and objective E and S disclosures promote corporate transparency that can help them build a positive reputation and trust with its stakeholders, which in turn can help mitigate the firm's idiosyncratic/operational risk. These findings are important for all corporate stakeholders including managers, employees, and suppliers who have a significant economic interest in the survival and success of the firm.

This paper presents a comprehensive archival examination of FTSE 100 companies in the period 2001-2005, focusing on the relationship between the presence of women on company boards and both accountancy-based and stock-based measures of company performance. Consistent with work by Adams, Gupta and Leeth this analysis reveals that there was no relationship between women's presence on boards and 'objective' accountancy-based measures of performance (return on assets, return on equity). However, consistent with 'glass cliff' research there was a negative relationship between women's presence on boards and 'subjective' stock-based measures of performance. Companies with male-only boards enjoyed a valuation premium of 37% relative to firms with a woman on their board. Results support claims that women are found on the boards of companies that are perceived to be performing poorly and that their presence on boards can lead to the devaluation of companies by investors. Yet the findings also indicate that perceptions and investment are not aligned with the underlying realities of company performance.

This paper examines whether and to what extent CEO personal traits (hubris, in particular) affect firm environmental innovation. Using the overarching theoretical framework of upper‐echelons theory, the paper builds on the insights from the corporate strategy, innovation, and corporate social responsibility literatures. We also examine the moderating role of firm‐specific features (e.g. organizational slack) and the external environment (e.g. market uncertainty) in this context. Based on a sample of UK companies operating in sensitive industries, we find that CEO hubris facilitates the engagement in green innovative projects. We also find that CEO hubris does not have a uniform effect: its effect on environmental innovation increases with the organizational slack, but weakens with the extent of environmental uncertainty. Our findings suggest that availability of resources per se is not enough to produce environmental innovation. Instead, it requires a stable external environment that enables the CEO with a hubristic personality to make a correct use of them.

This study examined how top management team's (TMT) international orientation influences perceptions of environmental uncertainty and how these perceptions impact international strategic decisions, in particular regarding ownership stakes taken in foreign acquisitions. We highlighted the need for the concept of TMT international orientation to encompass executives' formative-years' international experiences along with their international career experiences and nationalities. Empirical tests based on a sample of 2122 international acquisitions completed by 561 UK firms over the period 1999-2008 showed that TMT international orientation positively moderated the negative impact of cultural differences and host country risk on acquisition ownership stakes.The results underscored the importance of considering decision-makers' attributes due to their experiences at a young age, beyond their demographic characteristics or professional experience, in the context of international strategic choices. We also discussed some implications of one of the possible consequences of executives' formative international experience, namely biculturalism, for international business.

This paper examines the payout policies of UK firms listed on the London Stock Exchange during the 1990s. It complements the existing literature by analyzing the trends in both dividends and total payouts (including share repurchases). In a dynamic panel data regression setting, we relate target payout ratios to control structure variables.Profitability drives payout decisions of the UK companies, but the presence of strong block holders or block holder coalitions considerably weakens the relationship between corporate earnings and payout dynamics. While the impact of the voting power of shareholders' coalitions on payout ratios is found to be always negative, the magnitude of this effect differs across different categories of block holders (i.e. industrial firms, outside individuals, directors, financial institutions). The controlling shareholders appear to trade off the agency problems of free cash flow against the risk of underinvestment, and try to enforce payout policies that optimally balance these two costs. Finally, the paper improves upon some methodological flaws of the recent empirical studies of payout policy. . In a dynamic panel data regression setting, we relate target payout ratios to control structure variables.Profitability drives payout decisions of the UK companies, but the presence of strong block holders or block holder coalitions considerably weakens the relationship between corporate earnings and payout dynamics. While the impact of the voting power of shareholders' coalitions (measured by Banzhaf power indices) on payout ratios is found to be always negative, the magnitude of this effect differs across different categories of block holders (i.e. industrial firms, outside individuals, directors, financial institutions). The controlling shareholders appear to trade off the agency problems of free cash flow against the risk of underinvestment, and try to enforce payout policies that optimally balance these two costs. Finally, the paper improves upon some methodological flaws of the recent empirical studies of payout policy.JEL classification: G35, G32, G30.

This paper offers a new explanation of the gender pay gap in leadership positions by examining the relationship between managerial bonuses and company performance. Drawing on fi ndings of gender studies, agency theory, and the leadership literature, we argue that the gender pay gap is a context-specifi c phenomenon which results partly from the fact that company performance has a moderating impact on pay inequalities. Employing a matched sample of 192 female and male executive directors of UK listed fi rms we corroborate the existence of the gender pay disparities in corporate boardrooms. In line with our theoretical predictions, we fi nd that bonuses awarded to men are not only larger than those allocated to women, but also that managerial compensation of male executive directors is much more performance-sensitive than that of female executives. The contribution of attributional and expectancy-related dynamics to these patterns is highlighted in line with previous work on gender stereotypes and implicit leadership theories such as the romance of leadership. Gender differences in risk-taking and confi dence are also considered as potential explanations for the observed pay disparities. The implications of organizations' indifference to women's performance are examined in relation to issues surrounding the recognition and retention of female talent.

The paper examines the payout policy of UK firms listed on the London Stock Exchange during the 1990s. We complement the existing payout literature studies by analyzing jointly the trends in dividends and share repurchases. Unlike in the US, we find that, in the UK, firms do not demonstrate a decreasing propensity to distribute funds to shareholders. The role of share repurchases is increasing, but dividends still constitute a vast proportion of the total payout. Firms repurchasing shares usually pay dividends as well. We also document that there is a strong relationship between the presence of blockholders and the choice of the payout channel: firms with concentrated ownership tend to opt for dividends rather than share repurchases, irrespectively of the identity of the controlling shareholder. We argue that the differential taxation of dividends and capital gains as well as the insider trading regulation affect the relative attractiveness of dividends and share repurchases to large shareholders.JEL classification: G35, G32, G30. repurchases. Unlike in the US, we find that, in the UK, firms do not demonstrate a decreasing propensity to distribute funds to shareholders. The role of share repurchases is increasing, but dividends still constitute a vast proportion of the total payout. Firms repurchasing shares usually pay dividends as well. We also document that there is a strong relationship between the presence of blockholders and the choice of the payout channel: firms with concentrated ownership tend to opt for dividends rather than share repurchases, irrespectively of the identity of the controlling shareholder. We argue that the differential taxation of dividends and capital gains as well as the insider trading regulation affect the relative attractiveness of dividends and share repurchases to large shareholders.JEL classification: G35, G32, G30.