While political protest and labor unions are seen as important elements in democratic societies, systematic research on the relationship between the two is scarce. Past research finds that union members are more likely to engage in protest, but it is unclear whether unions increase protest among non-members. This study draws on two waves of data from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study and examines two mechanisms through which labor unions facilitate political protest among non-members: social ties and aggregate strength. We provide evidence that labor unions mobilize non-members to engage in political protest. When non-members have a social tie to a union or live in a state where unions are more robust and widespread, they are more likely to engage in political protest, but no more likely to engage in non-collective forms of political participation such as donating to political causes or contacting officials. The findings extend our understanding of an important, but understudied, act of political behavior as well as the ways that societal institutions stimulate collective political mobilization.

Executive SummaryDespite the fact that many low-wage, violation-ridden industries are disproportionately occupied by immigrants, labor standards and immigration reform have largely been treated as separate pieces of an otherwise interrelated puzzle. Not only is this view misguided, but this paper argues that strengthening labor standards enforcement would ensure that standards are upheld for all workers, immigrant and others. In addition, labor standards enforcement is instrumental to the erosion of sub-standard conditions in certain sectors, often referred to as the "secondary" labor market, that are associated with advanced market economies. Ensuring labor standards are upheld diminishes the incentive for employers to undercut wages by exploiting vulnerable workers, many of whom are immigrants. As this paper argues, strengthening enforcement must include not only "vertical" mechanisms, including strategic enforcement and penalizing and criminalizing egregious and repeated labor violators, but also "lateral" mechanisms, such as co-enforcement by workers and through worker and community organizations. The article illustrates the role of co-enforcement in labor standards through two case studies.

Despite the fact that many low-wage, violation-ridden industries are disproportionately occupied by immigrants, labor standards and immigration reform have largely been treated as separate pieces of an otherwise interrelated puzzle. Not only is this view misguided, but this paper argues that strengthening labor standards enforcement would ensure that standards are upheld for all workers, immigrant and others. In addition, labor standards enforcement is instrumental to the erosion of substandard conditions in certain sectors, often referred to as the "secondary" labor market, that are associated with advanced market economies. Ensuring labor standards are upheld diminishes the incentive for employers to undercut wages by exploiting vulnerable workers, many of whom are immigrants. As this paper argues, strengthening enforcement must include not only "vertical" mechanisms, including strategic enforcement and penalizing and criminalizing egregious and repeated labor violators, but also "lateral" mechanisms, such as co-enforcement by workers and through worker and community organizations. The article illustrates the role of co-enforcement in labor standards through two case studies.

No abstract

Context: Voting is the central instrument of democracy, yet there are a number of impediments that affect citizens' ability to turn out to vote. Health is one such impediment. Methods: This study draws on 2012 and 2016 election data from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study and the American National Election Studies and uses objective validated measures of voter turnout as well as postelection data on respondents' reasons for nonvoting to examine the relationship between self-reported health and voter turnout. Findings: The results indicate poor health depresses turnout among low-income voters but not high-income voters. A low-income citizen in poor health is 7 points less likely to turn out to vote than a low-income citizen in excellent health is. In contrast, a high-income citizen in poor health is just as likely to vote as a high-income citizen in excellent health is. Moreover, low-income citizens in poor health are 10 points more likely to cite sickness as an impediment to voting than are otherwise similar high-income citizens who are also in poor health. Conclusions: The findings have implications for health policy and unequal electoral engagement and suggest that health may narrow the scope of US democracy as poor health pushes low-income citizens out of the electoral sphere while high-income citizens continue to turn out to vote regardless of their underlying health conditions.