Worker centres, community-based mediating institutions that provide support to low-wage workers in the United States, have grown from five in 1992 to 160 in 2007. With unions increasingly targeting low-wage immigrant workers employed in non-footloose industries for organizing drives, it would seem that worker centres and unions are a match made in heaven. On the ground, however, it has been more of a mismatch. This article examines the underlying sources of the mismatch embodied in the structures, ideologies and cultures of worker centres and unions. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2007.

Today's low-wage workforce is mostly ignored by the national political parties and largely untouched by organized labor. Over the last twenty years, "community unions" have emerged to try to fill the void. They are modest-sized communitybased organizations of low-wage workers that, through a combination of service, advocacy, and organizing, focus on issues of work and wages. Community unions have so far had greater success at raising wages and improving working conditions via public policy rather than direct labor market intervention. This is because lowwage workers in America today have greater political than economic power.

Structures of employment in low-wage industries, a diminished wage and hour inspectorate, and an unworkable immigration regime have combined to create an environment where violations of basic workplace laws are everyday occurrences. This article identifies four “logics” of detection and enforcement, arguing that there is a mismatch between the enforcement strategies of most federal and state labor inspectorates and the industries in which noncompliance continues to be a problem. In response, the authors propose augmenting labor inspectorates by giving public interest groups like unions and worker centers a formal, ongoing role in enforcement in low-wage sectors. In three case studies, the authors present evidence of an emergent system—one that harkens back to a logic proposed by the drafters of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) but never implemented—of empowering those closest to the action to work in partnership with government.

Over the last decade, cities, counties, and states across the United States have enacted higher minimum wages, paid sick leave and family leave, domestic worker protections, wage theft laws, “Ban the Box” removal of questions about conviction history from job applications, and fair scheduling laws. Nevertheless, vulnerable workers still do not trust government to come forward and report labor law violations. The article argues that while increasing the size of the labor inspectorate and engaging in strategic enforcement are necessary, they are not sufficient. It argues that co-enforcement, in which government partners with organizations that have industry expertise and relationships with vulnerable workers, has the potential to manage the shifting and decentralized structures of twenty-first-century production, which were explicitly designed to evade twentieth-century laws and enforcement capabilities. The article aims to contribute to a broader understanding of the role of organizations in enforcement and the circumstances in which their effectiveness can be maximized. It sets forth a set of scope conditions and mechanisms and examines empirical cases of co-enforcement in Austin, Los Angeles, and San Francisco. The main findings are that co-enforcement is most enduring when (1) government agencies and worker organizations recognize each other’s unique capacities, rather than attempt to substitute for one another (2); the effort focuses on a specific industry; and (3) the collaboration receives strong political support. Sustaining the impacts of co-enforcement is found to require greater formalization of the partnership and funding streams.