4 studies investigated the broad claim that preschoolers understand biological inheritance. In Study 1, 4-7-year-old children were told a story in which a boy was born to one man and adopted by another. The biological father was described as having one set of features (e.g., green eyes) and the adoptive father as having another (e.g., brown eyes). Subjects were asked which man the boy would resemble when he grew up. Preschoolers showed little understanding that selective chains of processes mediate resemblance to parents. It was not until age 7 that children substantially associated the boy with his biological father on physical features and his adoptive father on beliefs. That is, it was not until age 7 that children demonstrated that they understood birth as part of a process selectively mediating the acquisition of physical traits and learning or nurturance as mediating the acquisition of beliefs. In Study 2, subjects were asked whether, as a boy grew up, various of his features could change. Children generally shared our adult intuitions, indicating that their failure in Study 1 was not due to their having a different sense of what features can change. Studies 3 and 4 replicated Study 1, with stories involving mothers instead of fathers and with lessened task demands. Taken together, the results of the 4 studies refute the claim that preschoolers understand biological inheritance. The findings are discussed in terms of whether children understand biology as an autonomous cognitive domain.

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Two studies explore conceptual change in the acquisition of wine expertise. In Experiment 1, tasters described a set of wines. Experts described the wines using more specific features than did intermediates, who, in turn, used more specific features than did novices. Specificity in describing wines was not related to discrimination performance on a psychophysical test. A regression analysis indicated that the features identified by the expert as well as those identified by the nonexpert tasters covaried with grape type, such that wines of the same grape were described more similarly than were wines of different grapes. In Experiment 2, the same tasters sorted the wines into clusters. Experts, unlike nonexperts, tended to sort the wines explicitly by grape type. Moreover, the features of the wines (described by the tasters in Experiment 1) covaried significantly better by the experts' clusters than they did by the nonexperts' clusters. Indeed, the features identified by the nonexperts covaried significantly worse when the wines were clustered by their own sortings than they did when the wines were clustered by actual grape type. It is suggested that the acquisition of wine expertise, a domain that is at once conceptual and perceptual, entails not only a greater differentiation of features but also a restructuring of the explicit schemes of classification.Once we grant that there are such things as experts and that they are, within their worlds, different from novices, we are led to ask just how profoundly different they are. Might they have undergone the kind of conceptual change described by students of the history of science and conceptual development (

4 studies investigated the broad claim that preschoolers understand biological inheritance. In Study 1, 4-7-year-old children were told a story in which a boy was born to one man and adopted by another. The biological father was described as having one set of features (e.g., green eyes) and the adoptive father as having another (e.g., brown eyes). Subjects were asked which man the boy would resemble when he grew up. Preschoolers showed little understanding that selective chains of processes mediate resemblance to parents. It was not until age 7 that children substantially associated the boy with his biological father on physical features and his adoptive father on beliefs. That is, it was not until age 7 that children demonstrated that they understood birth as part of a process selectively mediating the acquisition of physical traits and learning or nurturance as mediating the acquisition of beliefs. In Study 2, subjects were asked whether, as a boy grew up, various of his features could change. Children generally shared our adult intuitions, indicating that their failure in Study 1 was not due to their having a different sense of what features can change. Studies 3 and 4 replicated Study 1, with stories involving mothers instead of fathers and with lessened task demands. Taken together, the results of the 4 studies refute the claim that preschoolers understand biological inheritance. The findings are discussed in terms of whether children understand biology as an autonomous cognitive domain.

Five studies argue against claims that preschoolers understand a biological germ theory of illness. In Studies 1-3, participants were read stories in which characters develop symptoms (e.g., a bellyache) caused by germs, poisons, or events (e.g., eating too much candy) and were asked whether another character could catch the symptoms from the first. Few children made judgments in terms of germs as part of an underlying causal process linking the origin of a symptom to its subsequent transmission. Some children may have reasoned simply that certain kinds of symptoms are likely to be contagious. Studies 4 and 5 undermined the claim that preschoolers understand germs to be uniquely biological causal agents. Young children did not attribute properties to germs as they did for animate beings or for plants. It is suggested that children undergo conceptual reorganization in constructing a Western adult understanding of germs.

Three studies examined young children's understanding of the biologically causal role of birth in determining animal properties and species kind identity. In Studies 1 and 2, 4- to 7-year-olds and adults were told stories in which a baby was born to an animal of one species (e.g., a horse) but was adopted and raised by an animal of another species (e.g., a cow). In Study 1, children were asked to judge which parent the baby would resemble on a set of physical properties and beliefs. The majority of children were unable to say that the baby would resemble the birth parent on physical properties but share the beliefs of the adoptive parent. These results indicate that children were not using domain-specific causal understandings to reason about the origins of these properties. In Study 2, however, when asked to explicitly predict the kind of the baby, even 5-year-olds were able to reliably judge that the baby would be of the same species kind as the birth parent rather than the adoptive parent. This result suggests that children do understand at some level that birth determines species kind. Study 3 examined further the extent to which knowledge about birth influenced children's inferences about properties. Five-year-olds were asked to judge whether a baby would share a set of physical and nonphysical properties with its mother or its father. The results showed that children who knew the factual information about where babies come from (i.e., inside mommies' tummies) were more likely to attribute the mother's properties to the baby than the father's, regardless of whether the properties were physical or nonphysical. But this finding was true only if the property of one of the parents was not inherently more desirable or true than that of the other parent. In sum, the results of these 3 studies indicate that knowledge of birth does play a role in children's inferential reasoning, even for 5-year-olds, but that that role is not domain-specific. The implications for children's understanding of biological inheritance are discussed.

Three studies examined young children's understanding of the biologically causal role of birth in determining animal properties and species kind identity. In Studies 1 and 2, 4- to 7-year-olds and adults were told stories in which a baby was born to an animal of one species (e.g., a horse) but was adopted and raised by an animal of another species (e.g., a cow). In Study 1, children were asked to judge which parent the baby would resemble on a set of physical properties and beliefs. The majority of children were unable to say that the baby would resemble the birth parent on physical properties but share the beliefs of the adoptive parent. These results indicate that children were not using domain-specific causal understandings to reason about the origins of these properties. In Study 2, however, when asked to explicitly predict the kind of the baby, even 5-year-olds were able to reliably judge that the baby would be of the same species kind as the birth parent rather than the adoptive parent. This result suggests that children do understand at some level that birth determines species kind. Study 3 examined further the extent to which knowledge about birth influenced children's inferences about properties. Five-year-olds were asked to judge whether a baby would share a set of physical and nonphysical properties with its mother or its father. The results showed that children who knew the factual information about where babies come from (i.e., inside mommies' tummies) were more likely to attribute the mother's properties to the baby than the father's, regardless of whether the properties were physical or nonphysical. But this finding was true only if the property of one of the parents was not inherently more desirable or true than that of the other parent. In sum, the results of these 3 studies indicate that knowledge of birth does play a role in children's inferential reasoning, even for 5-year-olds, but that that role is not domain-specific. The implications for children's understanding of biological inheritance are discussed.