Arrow's (2022) recent Social and Personality Psychology Compass article, the same dubious attacks have also emerged elsewhere. We remind the field that although there are reasons to keep an eye on the overlap among the traits, the field of Dark Triad research is progressing well. Overwhelming evidence demonstrates that the traits are independent of one another-both theoretically and empirically. The bulk of concerns regarding Dark Triad overlap stem from Machiavellianism and psychopathy. However, it is critical to understand that Machiavellianism is a situationally contingent variable. Thus, misbehavior associated with Machiavellianism is dependent upon the environment (Jones & Mueller, 2021;Jones & Paulhus, 2017). Consequently, research on Machiavellianism that ignores contexts and situations (and instead relies on single timepoint, self-report surveys) creates distorted perceptions of the unique properties of Dark Triad traits. It is on this illusion that Kay and Arrow's (2022) criticisms rest. | Criticisms of the Dark TriadThe crux of Kay and Arrow's (2022) thesis is that traditional approaches to measuring the Dark Triad are flawed. They argue that the most logical model of dark personality should instead rely on an "elemental approach," which originates from the Big Five model of personality (Costa & McCrae, 1992). In particular, the authors claim that issues with the current state of the Dark Triad can be alleviated by breaking down the traits into smaller components. While addressing the multifaceted nature of personality traits can be worthwhile depending on the research question, Kay and Arrow's argument has three core problems: (1) too narrow of a discussion when comparing, and critiquing, the existing measures of the Dark Triad, (2) ignoring parsimony and practicality, and (3) failure to bolster the elemental approach via comparisons of relevant metrics. We next describe-and address-each of these issues in more detail.

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Rats eating high fat chow are more sensitive to the behavioral effects of dopaminergic drugs, including methamphetamine and the dopamine D2/D3 receptor agonist quinpirole, than rats eating standard chow. However, limited work has explored possible sex differences regarding the impact of diet on drug sensitivity. It is also unknown if eating high fat chow enhances sensitivity of rats to other dopamine (e.g., D1) receptor agonists. To explore these possibilities, male and female Sprague Dawley rats eating standard laboratory chow (17% kcal from fat) or high fat chow (60% kcal from fat) were tested once per week for 6 weeks with dopamine D1 receptor agonist SKF 82958 (0.01-3.2 mg/kg) or methamphetamine (0.1-3.2 mg/kg) using cumulative dosing procedures. Eating high fat chow increased sensitivity of male and female rats to methamphetamine-induced locomotion; however, only female rats eating high fat chow were more sensitive to SKF 82958-induced locomotion. SKF 82958-induced eye blinking was also marginally, though not significantly enhanced among female rats eating high fat chow, but not males. Further, while dopamine D2 receptor expression was significantly increased for SKF 82958-treated rats eating high fat chow regardless of sex, no differences were observed in dopamine D1 receptor expression. Taken together, the present study suggests that while eating high fat chow enhances sensitivity of both sexes to dopaminergic drugs, the mechanism driving this effect might be different for males versus females. These data further demonstrate the importance of studying both sexes simultaneously when investigating factors that influence drug sensitivity.

Political ideology in the United States is typically described as a spectrum. This metaphor implies that the people who place themselves along the spectrum differ in degree from each other; an individual who places themselves all the way on the left of the spectrum, is an extreme version of another closer to the middle. Political polarization and elite extremism are on the rise in the United States (e.g., Finkel et al., 2020), and attention to political polarization has fueled efforts to understand the extreme right (e.g, Forscher & Kteily, 2020), and driven attempts to identify whether the extreme left may or may not share authoritarian tendencies with those on the extreme right (Conway et al., 2018; Costello et al., 2021; Badaan et al., 2020; Nilsson & Jost, 2020). The central focus of psychology on the extreme Left has been on Left-wing authoritarianism¬—whether it exists, is appropriately named, or logically possible (Conway et al., 2018; Costello et al., 2021; Badaan & Jost, 2020; Nilsson & Jost, 2020). However, this approach sidesteps a longstanding distinction that exists among politically left-leaning individuals–that between Leftists and Liberals (see Menand, 2021). While Leftists explicitly describe themselves as completely separate from Liberals¬, who they claim cooperate with existing institutions and seek insufficient social change (Ture, 1966), Liberals may more easily see themselves as part of a larger left-leaning political group, such that they express surprise and even anger when Leftists do not support their political agenda (Capeheart, 2020). It is the aim of this paper to investigate the psychological differences between Leftists and Liberals (i.e., in terms of ideology, morality, political preferences, and judgments of group boundaries) to further our understanding of how these two historical groups may differ and interact, and help us understand political ideology, identity, and radicalism, more broadly.