Aristotle's invokes a specifically human desire, namely wish (boulēsis), to provide a teleological explanation of the pursuit of the specifically human good in terms of virtuous activity. Wish is a basic, unreasoned desire which, independently of other desires, or evaluative attitudes, motivates the pursuit of the human good. Even a person, who pursues what she mistakenly believes to be good, is motivated by wish for what in fact is good, although she is oblivious of it. KeywordsAristotle; wish; motivation; teleology; human good; representation IntroductionA striking feature of Aristotle's psychology is the assumption of a specifically human desire, namely wish (βούλησις). But there is little agreement on the nature, and function, of wish, and even on its most basic characteristics. For instance, despite fairly straightforward evidence for the view that wish is located in the rational part of the soul (DA 3.9, 432b5-6; Top. 4.5, 126a13), there is significant dissent.1 Moreover, no one questions that wish is a desire for the good (τἀγαθόν), but what notion of the good Aristotle has in mind is contested. 2 These disagreements are no wonder, since Aristotle is not particularly explicit about wish, and the evidence is scattered in the corpus. Therefore, with some important exceptions, wish is treated on the sidelines of discussions of Aristotle's psychology, philosophy of action, and ethics. I shall argue that wish is invoked in order to provide a teleological explanation of the pursuit of the specifically human end, which fulfils human nature. 4 The idea is that wish is a basic desire which, independently of other desires, or evaluative attitudes, motivates pursuit of what is good for human beings specifically. Wish is, by nature (φύσει), for what is good for human beings (EE 2.10, 1227a28-9). The human good, again, is virtuous activity, which manifests human rational nature, and which is an independent value in the sense that it is not reducible to, or derivable from, objects of other kinds of desire.Although located in the rational part of the soul, wish motivates not only the exercises of the two intellectual virtues, namely theoretical understanding (σοφία) and practical wisdom shall argue, the ultimate motivation to pursue exercises of character virtue is the rational part's desire for the human good.

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In Nicomachean Ethics (= Eth. Nic.) 10.2, Aristotle addresses Eudoxus' argument that pleasure is the chief good in his characteristically dialectical manner. The argument is that pleasure is the chief good, since all creatures, rational (ἔλλογα) and non-rational (ἄλογα) alike, are perceived to aim at pleasure (1172b9–11). At 1172b35–1173a5, Aristotle turns to an objection against Eudoxus' argument. For some object (οἱ δ’ἐνιστάμενοι) to the argument by questioning one of its premisses, namely that what all creatures aim at is the good (1172b12–15). Instead, they claim that what all creatures aim at is not good (ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθὸν οὗ πάντ’ ἐφίεται, 1172b36). This claim is reasonably taken to mean that not everything that all creatures aim at is good. But, as we shall shortly see, Aristotle dismisses it in a way suggesting a less charitable interpretation. At any rate, the significance of this objection is that it challenges the strong claim that what all creatures aim at is the good with an argument against the weaker claim that what all creatures aim at is good (or a good). For if the weaker claim is refuted, then the strong claim is refuted as well. Aristotle takes issue with the argument against the weaker claim, but without committing himself to the strong claim.

pins down the sophist as an imitator of the wise man (μιμητὴς τοῦ σοφοῦ) (268c1). The sophist's art is defined as "the contradiction-making art of the insincere and ignorant part of belief-forming art belonging to the appearance-making kind, derived from the image-making art, of the not divine but human art of production, which is distinguished in words as the wonder-making portion" (268c8-d2). The entire dialogue is devoted to laying down the prerequisites for this final definition of the sophist's art. 3 The dialogue thus displays a movement from the unconsidered belief, based on the appearance of the sophist, that he is a wise man, to the reasoned belief, based on considerations of his real being, that he is not.As far as the characterization of phantasia as a belief "through sense perception" is concerned, I will argue that it picks out sense perception as a power which can provide for the 2 content of beliefs independently of thinking. Hence, the two characterizations "according to thinking" and "through sense perception" are exclusive in the sense that they distinguish between two kinds of belief, which come about either by means of thought or through sense perception. Hence, I will take issue with the view that phantasia is a species of belief on the assumption that all beliefs, including phantasia, require thinking. 4 The qualification "through sense perception" is commonly held to distinguish a particular kind of beliefs, namely perceptual ones, which derive their content from sense perception.More precisely, the idea is that a phantasia is a belief, the predicate of which picks out a perceptible property. On this view, all beliefs are dependent on thinking, but some beliefs, like "Socrates is pale" or "Socrates is walking," count as phantasiai, whereas "Socrates is wise" or "Wisdom is a virtue" count as non-perceptual beliefs.The historical root of this reading is Aristotle's influential discussion of Plato's notion of phantasia. At De anima 3.3, 428 a 24-b 2, Aristotle specifies the content of Platonic phantasia as that which is perceived non-incidentally (μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός), that is sensible qualities such as white and warm. Aristotle's understanding of Plato's notion of phantasia is likely to be based on Theaetetus 152c1-2, and to some extent on 184d7-185a3. Taken together they may be taken to suggest that phantasia is a belief, the content of which is confined to sensible qualities. But using Socrates's saying at 152c1-2 that "Appearing and sense perception, then, are the same in respect of hot things, and all things of that sort" 5 as direct evidence for Plato's view on phantasia and sense perception disregards the dialectical nature of this passage.Socrates is involved in providing a theoretical underpinning for Protagoras's "man the measure" doctrine. It would take an argument, to say the least, to establish that Socrates (and Plato) is committed to the conflation of sense perception and phantasia, and to the Heraclitean theory of sense perception. 6 Moreover, if the account at Theaetetu...