Why Is Aristotle’s Vicious Person Miserable?

Educating Desire in Aristotle

“…NE III.5 1114a13-14, Broadie (1991: 161), and Anscombe's notion of 'idle' wishes (1957: 67). 19 Grönroos (2015a) wants something stronger: a vicious agent who acts against her preferential choice. This, however, is problematic.…”

The flourishing–happiness concordance thesis: Some troubling counterexamples

“…He suffers, from time to time, from self-hate and regret, and he destroys himself in the end. On Aristotle's strict conception, these are the results of the specific motivational disunity of the non-virtuous (seeGrönroos, 2015). However, as I mention in the Concluding Remarks, Aristotle may have had too idealised a view of the motivational unity of the virtuous.…”