In this paper we show that in a simple spatial model where the government is chosen under strict proportional rule, if the outcome function is a linear combination of parties' positions, with coe¢cient equal to their share of votes, essentially only a two-party equilibrium exists. The two parties taking a positive number of votes are the two extremist ones. Applications of this result include an extension of the well-known Alesina and Rosenthal model of divided government as well as a modi…ed version of Besley and Coate's model of representative democracy. Di¤erent outcome functions are then analyzed.
Constitutional structures shape politicians' behaviour and hence policy outcomes through the dierent incentive schemes at work. In this paper we analyse these mechanisms in parliamentary and presidential systems. Such a comparison is carried over by analysing how the two systems are able to select the ecient policy in presence of asymmetric information. The constitutional structures dier in that the policy proposal in parliamentary democracies is observable and condence-dependent. The main ndings suggest that the parliament responds to the incentive scheme better in presidential systems due to less uncertainty that legislators face over their term limit. However, the parliamentary system induces the executive to behave more eciently due to selection and disciplining eects.
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