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A 2016 review of literature about automation, algorithms and politics identified China as the foremost area in which further research was needed because of the size of its population, the potential for Chinese algorithmic manipulation in the politics of other countries, and the frequency of exportation of Chinese software and hardware. This paper contributes to the small body of knowledge on the first point (domestic automation and opinion manipulation) and presents the first piece of research into the second (international automation and opinion manipulation). Findings are based on an analysis of 1.5 million comments on official political information posts on Weibo and 1.1 million posts using hashtags associated with China and Chinese politics on Twitter. In line with previous research, little evidence of automation was found on Weibo. In contrast, a large amount of automaton was found on Twitter. However, contrary to expectations and previous news reports, no evidence was found of pro-Chinese state automaton on Twitter. Automation on Twitter was associated with anti-Chinese state perspectives and published in simplified Mandarin, presumably aimed at diasporic Chinese and mainland users who Ôjump the wallÕ to access blocked platforms. These users come to Twitter seeking more diverse information and an online public sphere but instead they find an information environment in which a small number of anti-Chinese state voices are attempting to use automation to dominate discourse. Our understanding of public conversation on Twitter in Mandarin is extremely limited and, thus, this paper advances the understanding of political communication on social media.

Computational propaganda has recently exploded into public consciousness. The US Presidential Campaign of 2016 was marred by evidence, which continues to emerge, of targeted political propaganda and the use of bots to distribute political messages on social media. This computational propaganda is both a social and technical phenomenon. Technical knowledge is necessary to work with the massive databases used for audience targeting; it is necessary to create the bots and algorithms that distribute propaganda; it is necessary to monitor and evaluate the results of these efforts in agile campaigning. Thus, a technical knowledge comparable with those who create and distribute this propaganda is necessary to investigate the phenomenon.

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Since 2011, Chinese environmental authorities have undertaken a project of "occupying" online spaces, with a particular focus on social media like Weibo. These activities have been analysed alternatively as a promising attempt to improve environmental governance by increasing citizen engagement and transparency, or as a new tool of control over online environmental discourses. However, empirical research into the practices of state microblogs is rare, and the implications of their emergence for local environmental governance remain poorly understood. Using a combination of online and offline investigation methods, this paper analyses the use of microblogs by 172 local environmental authorities in Shandong Province, whose multi-level EPB microblogging system is seen as a model for other provinces, testing whether this system improves environmental governance, and whether this objective is impeded by practices aimed at controlling online environmental discourse. We find limited evidence of improved environmental governance that would be attested by enhanced information disclosure and active citizen engagement. Instead, EPB communication appears mostly insular, and obstructed by floods of diversionary content and propaganda. We suggest that while these behaviours are likely driven by misaligned state incentive structures and fears of triggering social unrest, they also support the goal of discursive control by occupation.