Security of robotics systems, as well as of the related middleware infrastructures, is a critical issue for industrial and domestic IoT, and it needs to be continuously assessed throughout the whole development lifecycle. The next generation open source robotic software stack, ROS2, is now targeting support for Secure DDS, providing the community with valuable tools for secure real world robotic deployments. In this work, we introduce a framework for procedural provisioning access control policies for robotic software, as well as for verifying the compliance of generated transport artifacts and decision point implementations.
Logging plays a crucial role in robotic research, providing prolonged insight into a robots encountered environmental stimuli, internal behavioral state, and performance or outcome of actions taken; all necessary for profiling and debugging robotic application ex post facto. As robotic development matures into production, logging assumes an additional role in equipping auditors with the evidence necessary for investigating issues, accidents or fraud. Given robotic sectors such as drone delivery or autonomous transport must operate in the open world, ensuring the integrity, authenticity and non-repudiation of generated logs on these mobile cyberphical systems presents new threats that extend beyond those in traditional IT computing: such as physical system access or postmortem collusion between robot and OEM resulting in the truncation or alteration of previous records. In this work, we address the topic of immutabilized logs using integrity proofs and distributed ledgers with the additional consideration for mobile and public service robotic applications.
Data Distribution Service (DDS) is a realtime peerto-peer protocol that serves as a scalable middleware between distributed networked systems found in many Industrial IoT domains such as automotive, medical, energy, and defense. Since the initial ratification of the standard, specifications have introduced a Security Model and Service Plugin Interface (SPI) architecture, facilitating authenticated encryption and data centric access control while preserving interoperable data exchange. However, as Secure DDS v1.1, the default plugin specifications presently exchanges digitally signed capability lists of both participants in the clear during the crypto handshake for permission attestation; thus breaching confidentiality of the context of the connection. In this work, we present an attacker model that makes use of network reconnaissance afforded by this leaked context in conjunction with formal verification and model checking to arbitrarily reason about the underlying topology and reachability of information flow, enabling targeted attacks such as selective denial of service, adversarial partitioning of the data bus, or vulnerability excavation of vendor implementations.
In recent years, we observed a growth of cybersecurity threats, especially due to the ubiquitous of connected and autonomous devices commonly defined as Internet of Things (IoT). These devices, designed to handle basic operations, commonly lacks security measurements. In this paper we want to tackle how we could, by design, apply static and dynamic security solutions for those devices and define security measurements without degrading overall the performance.
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