It has been suggested that gesture engrams, conceptual knowledge and/or the ability to infer function from structure can support object use. The present paper proposes an alternative view which is based upon the idea that object use requires solely the ability to reason about technical means provided by objects. Technical means are abstract principles which are not linked with any object representation (e.g., cutting involves the opposition between dense and permeable material). The technical reasoning model predicts that the inability to perform technical reasoning should impair performance in any situation requiring the use of objects (in a conventional way or not). Twenty left brain-damaged (LBD) patients, 11 right brain-damaged (RBD) patients and 41 healthy controls were examined on experimental tests assessing the conventional use of objects (e.g., screwing a screw with a screwdriver), conceptual knowledge about object function, pantomime of object use and recognition of object utilization gestures. We also designed the Unusual Use of Objects Test, which demands unusual applications of objects to achieve a purpose for which the usually applied object is not provided (e.g., screwing a screw with a knife). The key findings are that only LBD patients have more difficulties on the Unusual Use of Objects Test than controls or RBD patients, and that the severity of their impairment is correlated with that on conventional use of objects. Correlations with tests assessing conceptual knowledge as well as with tests of pantomime of object use and recognition of object utilization gestures were weaker. These results support the technical reasoning model and question the role of conceptual knowledge and gesture engrams in object use. Since the technical reasoning model also predicts two distinct technical disorders, the discussion focuses on the existence of these disorders in regard to individual performance profiles obtained in the Unusual Use of Objects Test.

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Background Language mapping during awake brain surgery is currently a standard procedure. However, mapping is rarely performed for other cognitive functions that are important for social interaction, such as visuospatial cognition and nonverbal language, including facial expressions and eye gaze. The main reason for this omission is the lack of tasks that are fully compatible with the restrictive environment of an operating room and awake brain surgery procedures. Objective This study aims to evaluate the feasibility and safety of a virtual reality headset equipped with an eye-tracking device that is able to promote an immersive visuospatial and social virtual reality (VR) experience for patients undergoing awake craniotomy. Methods We recruited 15 patients with brain tumors near language and/or motor areas. Language mapping was performed with a naming task, DO 80, presented on a computer tablet and then in 2D and 3D via the VRH. Patients were also immersed in a visuospatial and social VR experience. Results None of the patients experienced VR sickness, whereas 2 patients had an intraoperative focal seizure without consequence; there was no reason to attribute these seizures to virtual reality headset use. The patients were able to perform the VR tasks. Eye tracking was functional, enabling the medical team to analyze the patients’ attention and exploration of the visual field of the virtual reality headset directly. Conclusions We found that it is possible and safe to immerse the patient in an interactive virtual environment during awake brain surgery, paving the way for new VR-based brain mapping procedures. Trial Registration ClinicalTrials.gov NCT03010943; https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/NCT03010943.

The present study discusses the presence of different constraints on action selection during object use versus object transport. Sixteen left brain-damaged (LBD) patients, 10 right brain-damaged (RBD) and 35 healthy controls were examined on a grip preference test consisting of a grasping-to-transport and a grasping-to-use condition. Assessment included a general praxis testing (pantomime production, object utilization gesture recognition and object use). We also reported the case of a close-head injury patient (DR) with an atypical behavioural pattern. Our results supported the different constraint hypothesis. While several LBD and RBD patients performed inappropriate grips in the grasping-to-transport condition, only two patients (L2 and DR) used inappropriate grips in the grasping-to-use condition. No correlation was found between the two conditions of the grip preference test and measures of the general praxis testing. The discussion focuses on the nature of constraints on grip selection during object use and object transport.

Traumatic brain injury (TBI) causes impairments affecting instrumental activities of daily living (IADL). However, few studies have considered virtual reality as an ecologically valid tool for the assessment of IADL in patients who have sustained a TBI. The main objective of the present study was to examine the use of the Nonimmersive Virtual Coffee Task (NI-VCT) for IADL assessment in patients with TBI. We analyzed the performance of 19 adults suffering from TBI and 19 healthy controls (HCs) in the real and virtual tasks of making coffee with a coffee machine, as well as in global IQ and executive functions. Patients performed worse than HCs on both real and virtual tasks and on all tests of executive functions. Correlation analyses revealed that NI-VCT scores were related to scores on the real task. Moreover, regression analyses demonstrated that performance on NI-VCT matched real-task performance. Our results support the idea that the virtual kitchen is a valid tool for IADL assessment in patients who have sustained a TBI.

It has been suggested that both conceptual knowledge and the ability to infer function from structure can support object use. By contrast, we propose that object use requires solely the ability to reason about technical ends. Technical ends (e.g., cutting) are not purposes (e.g., eating), but the technical way to achieve them. This perspective suggests that there is no mutual relationship between technical ends and purposes since the same purpose (e.g., writing) can be achieved thanks to distinct technical ends (graving, tracing), and, inversely, the same technical end (e.g., tracing) can achieve different purposes (making up, writing). Thus, conceptual knowledge might determine which technical end is usually associated with a given purpose. To contribute to the discussion, we described the behaviour of a female patient with left temporal lobe lesions and bilateral frontal lobe lesions following a closed-head injury. Conceptual knowledge was impaired. She encountered difficulties in demonstrating the use of objects in isolation (e.g., using a screwdriver without the screw). The presence of a recipient (e.g., using a screwdriver with the screw) improved her performance. The performance was also normal when asked to perform unusual applications of objects to achieve a goal for which the usually applied object was not provided (e.g., screwing a screw with a knife). Consistent with the theoretical framework supported here, her performance profile suggests an intact ability to reason about technical ends (i.e., utilization), in the presence of a defective ability to determine the usual relationship between technical ends and purposes (i.e., usage).

Twenty-three frontal-brain-damaged subjects, 10 posterior-brain-damaged subjects and 10 normal controls were compared on script tasks. They were first asked to re-establish the sequential and hierarchical structure of 2 script actions, and then, they were asked to order 2 new scripts which contained aberrant items. Impairments in script information processing were observed only in frontal patients. Of the 23 frontal patient tested 8 made errors in ordering actions, in choosing scenes and in making estimates of action importance in the first task, and they rejected the aberrant elements in the second task. Eleven frontal subjects performed as well as the control subjects in the first task, but used the irrelevant items. The last 4 frontal patients performed as well as the control subjects in both tasks. These results support a possible fractionation of the frontal lobe syndrome.