Object utilization and object usage: A single-case study

Abstract

It has been suggested that both conceptual knowledge and the ability to infer function from structure can support object use. By contrast, we propose that object use requires solely the ability to reason about technical ends. Technical ends (e.g., cutting) are not purposes (e.g., eating), but the technical way to achieve them. This perspective suggests that there is no mutual relationship between technical ends and purposes since the same purpose (e.g., writing) can be achieved thanks to distinct technical ends (graving, tracing), and, inversely, the same technical end (e.g., tracing) can achieve different purposes (making up, writing). Thus, conceptual knowledge might determine which technical end is usually associated with a given purpose. To contribute to the discussion, we described the behaviour of a female patient with left temporal lobe lesions and bilateral frontal lobe lesions following a closed-head injury. Conceptual knowledge was impaired. She encountered difficulties in demonstrating the use of objects in isolation (e.g., using a screwdriver without the screw). The presence of a recipient (e.g., using a screwdriver with the screw) improved her performance. The performance was also normal when asked to perform unusual applications of objects to achieve a goal for which the usually applied object was not provided (e.g., screwing a screw with a knife). Consistent with the theoretical framework supported here, her performance profile suggests an intact ability to reason about technical ends (i.e., utilization), in the presence of a defective ability to determine the usual relationship between technical ends and purposes (i.e., usage).

Neural correlates of pantomiming familiar and unfamiliar tools: Action semantics versus mechanical problem solving?

“…Also, if technical reasoning is allowed, for example by offering the patient both the tool (i.e. a hammer) and its recipient (i.e., a nail), then the performance is greatly improved compared to when the patient is given the tool in isolation [Osiurak et al, 2008].…”

Disentangling the contributions of grasp and action representations in the recognition of manipulable objects

“…However, brain damage associated with impaired semantic information about tool function and manipulation has been shown to occur without concomitant impairment in tool-use (Negri et al 2007). Additionally, errors in grasps associated with using a tool are either small (Randerath et al 2009) or largely nonexistent (Osiruak et al 2008) in apraxia and show no correlation with the degree of impairment in tool-use, implying independent representations of functional action and grasp attributes.…”

Apraxia of tool use is not a matter of affordances

“…This knowledge specifies the purpose, recipient, and context wherein a tool can be used, and is commonly associated to the ventral stream. Evidence indicates that patients with a selective semantic deficit are able to actually use tools, when presented with the corresponding objects (e.g., a hammer with a nail; Buxbaum et al, 1997; Lauro-Grotto et al, 1997; Osiurak et al, 2008; Silveri and Ciccarelli, 2009). However, when the tool is presented in isolation, difficulties can occur, and are strongly linked to the semantic deficit (Sirigu et al, 1991; Hodges et al, 2000; Osiurak et al, 2008; see also Lesourd et al, 2013).…”

“…However, when tools are presented in isolation, they cannot determine the usual use, because knowledge about the social usages is impaired. Thus, those patients can attempt, on the basis of spared mechanical knowledge, to show that a key can be used for scrapping the chamfered edge of a wooden desk or a nail clipper can be used to attach several sheets of paper together (Sirigu et al, 1991; Osiurak et al, 2008). In other words, semantic knowledge about tool function can be viewed as another form of allocentric knowledge, linking the different tools and objects with the other tools and objects used for the same context or usage (Osiurak et al, 2010, 2011).…”