In this essay, we critique the usage of the term ‘institutional void’ to characterize non-Western contexts in organizational studies. We explore how ‘conceptual stretching’ of institutional voids – specifically, the theoretical and geographic expansion of the concept – has led not only to poor construct clarity, but also pejorative labelling of non-Western countries. We argue that research using this term perpetuates an ethnocentric bias by deifying market development and overlooking the richness and power of informal and non-market institutions in shaping local economic activity. We call for an ‘epistemological rupture’ to decolonize organizational scholarship in non-Western settings and facilitate contextually grounded research approaches that allow for more indigenous theorization.

Research Summary There is mounting evidence of a widespread popular backlash against globalization in advanced economies, which can hurt multinational companies' (MNCs) interests. In this article, we argue that MNCs are both “culprits” and “victims” of backlash against globalization. Building on the comparative capitalism literature, we argue that national institutions influence the likelihood of a backlash by either encouraging MNCs to embrace a “labor arbitrage” strategy consisting in tapping into cheap labor markets overseas or preventing them from doing so. Where institutional constraints lead firms to adopt an “upgrading” route of using domestic workers, popular backlash is less likely. Such institutional factors help to explain variation in the likelihood of backlash across countries. We also discuss the strategic options available to firms facing backlash. Managerial Summary Multinational companies are increasingly facing a backlash against globalization that, in some countries, may lead to policies that directly hurt their interests. Yet little is known about the link of this phenomenon with firm‐level strategies. In this article, we draw on comparative capitalism analysis to show that national institutions play a key role in determining the likelihood of backlash. They do so by inducing/discouraging MNCs to adopt certain strategies that expose non‐university‐educated workers to globalization pressures, influencing, in turn, the electorate's attitude toward globalization. We also present and discuss the strategic options available to firms facing backlash.

Since the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 the term “ordoliberalism” has experienced a marked revival. This discussion tends to focus on the need for more state intervention. Yet this misrepresents the core ideas of ordoliberalism because its main concern is not with “how much” but with “what kind of” intervention is needed. Thus, this article seeks to clarify the ordoliberal position, in particular its key distinction between market conforming and nonconforming state intervention. Discussing the current financial crisis, it also evaluates the potential benefits and drawbacks of ordoliberalism. The article rebukes rhetorical shortcuts that equate every economic policy coming out of Germany with ordoliberalism. It also suggests that while the ordoliberal conception does not necessarily provide a solution to the current problems in the short run, in the long run it may form the basis for a sounder conception of economic regulation than more libertarian views can offer.

The “return of the state” as an economic actor has left scholars at a lack of theoretical tools to capture the characteristics of state-dominated business systems. This is reflected in the fact that any type of state intervention in the economy is too easily qualified as a sign of “authoritarian capitalism,” which has led scholars to lump together countries as diverse as China, Singapore, and Norway under that heading. Rather than considering any type of state intervention in the economy as authoritarian, we propose a more sophisticated conceptualization, which distinguishes two boundaries between the public and the private domains and conceives of the “return of the state” as the erosion of one or both of them. This conceptualization allows us to clearly distinguish a shift from an ideal-typical market-based “regulatory capitalism” to “state capitalism” or “authoritarian capitalism,” respectively. We use interview data with business leaders in an extreme case of the return of the state to identify the nature of the mechanisms by which an authoritarian government erodes these private-public divides. We argue that a focus on these constitutive mechanisms of the erosion of private-public divides allows us to define “authoritarian capitalism” in a way that makes it a useful tool to understand contexts beyond the Chinese case in which it first emerged.

This paper reviews recent studies that analyse and criticise existing academic and commercial corporate governance (CG) indices. Most of these 'rating the ratings' papers reach the conclusion that encompassing composite measures of CG are ineffective and suggest therefore to return to simpler measures. This paper draws on the 'configurational-' or 'bundles approach' to CG and argues that, while the criticisms made by the 'rating the ratings' papers are justified, their recommendations are misguided. Based on four central insights derived from the 'bundles approach', the paper shows that reverting to simpler measures of firm-level CG practices is a step in the wrong direction, in that it eliminates information about interactions between different corporate governance mechanisms. This is particularly consequential for comparative CG research that aims to identify differences in country-specific CG systems. Alternative solutions are developed to improve corporate governance measures, which take into account insights from the 'bundles approach'.

JEL codes: F21, F23, O15While there is a growing literature concerned with multinational companies from emerging markets (EMNCs), it does not contain a robust conception of how institutions shape human resource (HR) practices in such firms. We contribute to filling this gap through developing a framework of how institutions create a range of constraints and opportunities for EMNCs. Specifically, our framework contains three key elements of how MNCs from emerging markets interact with institutions: EMNCs develop approaches that to some extent reflect the perceived strengths and weaknesses of the institutions in the home country (institutional conditioning); the strategies of actors in EMNCs can overcome the weaknesses of the home country by drawing on institutions in other countries (institutional arbitrage); and the actions of EMNCs can reinforce, or create pressures for change in, the institutional context in the countries in which they operate (institutional change/consolidation). By mapping this set of strategies of EMNCs, we contribute to a fuller understanding of the relationship between institutions and HR practices, and we outline how the rise of EMNCs reshapes the global landscape by adding new kinds of firm behavior to capitalist diversity. K E Y W O R D Scomparative institutional analysis, emerging market multinationals, emerging markets, human resource management, institutions effect (e.g., Ferner, 1997), but there are significant gaps in our

Interlocking directorate networks among business enterprises have increasingly come under pressure due to internationalization and deregulation of markets. We show that in the small and internationalized economies of Switzerland and the Netherlands extensive changes have taken place. However, considerable differences in the form and the extent of these changes exist between the two countries. We argue that only by investigating which actors change their behavior we can understand and interpret the reasons for changes in the network structure. Combining a review of the Dutch and Swiss corporate governance landscape with a network analysis of board interlocks, we show that the changes in corporate networks are strongly affected by individual corporate strategies. The changing role of financial institutions in particular explains much of the variance between the two countries. Increasing influence of market pressures through dispersed ownership, on the contrary, does not explain changing patterns of interlocking directorates.

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