The benefits from cost‐reducing research and their distribution under a range of price policies are compared with those that would arise in the absence of the policies. While any price policy affects the distribution of research benefits, the net national or world benefits may be reduced, lef unchanged, or increased, depending on the nature of the policy and the significance of the country in the world market for the commodity. Some implications for decisions on price policies and for distortions in incentives for the allocation of resources to research are raised.

In a multistage production system, research that reduces production costs at one stage provides benefits to producers at all stages and to consumers. Agricultural production is assumed to involve three stages: nonfarm input, farm, and marketing. Research causes a parallel drop of the supply curve. Benefits are measured as changes in economic surplus. With a competitive model, the distribution of research benefits is the same for research directed at each production stage. Implications for the distribution of research benefits of some forms of imperfect competition are investigated.

This paper develops a model for assessing the aggregate level and distribution of the benefits of res each into tradable commodities. It estimates gains to Australia and to the rest of the world from research into the wool and wheat industries.

The deregulation of dairy marketing that occurred on 1 July 2000 is a fascinating case study in microeconomic reform. The role of interacting industry and institutional features in the movement to deregulation is explained, with political realities being recognised. A key part of the deregulation bundle was an unprecedented "structural adjustment" package valued at about one and a half billion dollars (in 1998-1999). Questions are raised about the rationale for this package, the process of determining it and the means of funding it.

In July 1993 the Wool Industry Review (Garnaut) Committee presented its recommendations on disposal of the wool stockpile, on wool marketing, and on organizational arrangements in the wool industry. This paper focuses on the Report's treatment of two issues central to the future economic benefits to Australia from wool: the approach to the industry's stockpile‐related debt, and disposal of the stockpile. There are strong grounds for thinking that the Garnaut Committee's recommendations on these issues– accepted by the government–are contrary to the best interests of the wool industry and Australia.