Why are many large non-governmental organizations (NGOs) becoming multinational entities? What are the welfare implications of this integration of markets for development donations? To answer these questions, we build a simple two-country model with horizontally differentiated NGOs competing in fundraising. We find that NGOs become multinational if the economies of scale in fundraising are sufficiently large. In that case, national NGOs in the smaller country disappear, while some national NGOs remain in the larger country only if country sizes are sufficiently different. Social welfare is higher in the regime with multinationals than under autarky
In close elections, a sufficiently high share of invalid ballots -if driven by voter mistakes or electoral fraud -can jeopardize the electoral outcome. We study how the closeness of electoral race relates to the share of invalid ballots, under the traditional paper-ballot hand-counted voting technology. Using a large dataset from the Italian parliamentary elections in 1994-2001, we find a strong robust negative relationship between the margin of victory of the leading candidate over the nearest rival and the share of invalid ballots. We argue that this relationship is not driven by voter mistakes, protest, or electoral fraud. The explanation that garners most support is that of rational allocation of effort by election officers and party representatives, with higher rates of detection of invalid ballots in close elections. In general, in most large elections, there is a relatively small fraction of votes that is counted as invalid. When electoral race is tight, even a small number of votes can make a difference for the electoral outcome, and thus the importance of invalid ballots increases disproportionately. Intuitively, if the share of invalid ballots is sufficiently high as compared to the margin of victory of the winning candidate, and is driven by voter mistakes or electoral fraud, then invalid ballots might seriously undermine the correct functioning of the electoral system.
KeywordsThe validity of this common-sense intuition crucially depends on the origin of invalid ballots and the relationship between the fraction of invalid ballots and electoral competition. In this paper, we study how the closeness of electoral race relates to the fraction of invalid ballots under the traditional paper-ballot hand-counted voting technology. Using a large dataset from the Italian parliamentary elections in 1994-2001, we find a strong robust negative correlation between the margin of victory of the leading candidate over the nearest rival and the fraction of invalid ballots.We then investigate the possible theoretical explanations for this relationship and argue, on the basis of econometric evidence, that this relationship is unlikely to be driven by voter mistakes, protest, or electoral fraud. The explanation that garners most support is that election officers and party representatives rationally allocate more effort in detecting invalid ballots when the stakes are highest, i.e. when the electoral race is closer. In other words, the relationship that we document corresponds to higher rates of detection of invalid ballots in closer elections.
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