In 1997 and 1998, H3N2 influenza A viruses emerged among pigs in North America. Genetic analyses of the H3N2 isolates demonstrated that they had distinctly different genotypes. The most commonly isolated viruses in the United States have a triple-reassortant genotype, with the hemagglutinin, neuraminidase, and PB1 polymerase genes being of human influenza virus origin, the nucleoprotein, matrix, and nonstructural genes being of classical swine influenza virus origin, and the PA and PB2 polymerase genes being of avian influenza virus origin. In contrast, a wholly human H3N2 virus was isolated from a single baby pig in Ontario, Canada, in 1997, but it did not spread within the swine population. Genetic differences between this wholly human virus and the triple-reassortant viruses may affect their replication efficiencies in pigs. In the present study we compared the pathogenicities and replication kinetics of the wholly human virus and a triple-reassortant virus in 7-week-old pigs that were infected intranasally with 2 ؋ 10 3 to 2 ؋ 10 6 50% tissue culture infective doses of virus. Our results demonstrate that the wholly human virus replicated to significantly lower titers and that the onset of virus shedding was delayed compared to the replication titers and the time of onset of virus shedding in triple-reassortant viruses. In addition, infection with the triple-reassortant virus was associated with moderate to severe gross pathological and histological pulmonary lesions, while infection with the wholly human virus induced only mild pulmonary changes.

Influenza is a highly contagious disease that has burdened both humans and animals since ancient times. In humans, the most dramatic consequences of influenza are associated with periodically occurring pandemics. Pandemics require the emergence of an antigenically novel virus to which the majority of the population lacks protective immunity. Historically, influenza A viruses from animals have contributed to the generation of human pandemic viruses and they may do so again in the future. It is, therefore, critical to understand the epidemiological and molecular mechanisms that allow influenza A viruses to cross species barriers. This review summarizes the current knowledge of influenza ecology, and the viral factors that are thought to determine influenza A virus species specificity.

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Background: Because of the serious disease sequelae associated with equine herpesvirus type 1 (EHV-1) infections, awareness and control measures used to control outbreaks are important issues for all horse populations.Objectives: Describe the occurrence and management of an outbreak of EHV-1 infection at a veterinary hospital. Animals: Horses hospitalized at a referral veterinary hospital. Methods: A horse with myeloencephalopathy associated with EHV-1 infection (EHM) was admitted for diagnostic evaluation and treatment under strict infection control procedures. We describe the occurrence and management of a nosocomial outbreak of EHV-1 infections associated with admission of this patient.Results: Despite institution of rigorous biosecurity precautions at the time of admission of the index case, EHV-1 infections spread to 6 other horses that were hospitalized at the James L. Voss Veterinary Teaching Hopsital, including 2 that served as sources of infection for horses on their home premises after discharge. Infection with EHV-1 was confirmed by polymerase chain reaction (PCR) and by seroconversion documented by glycoprotein G ELISA. A voluntary quarantine was imposed and admissions were restricted to prevent additional horses from being exposed. Quarantine duration was abbreviated by serial testing of all horses with PCR.Conclusions and Clinical Importance: These findings illustrate the contagious disease risk that can accompany management of horses with EHM. Horses with active nasal EHV-1 shedding should be isolated in an airspace that is separate from other horses by strictly enforced biosecurity and isolation procedures. Serial testing with PCR may be a useful adjunct to determine when the risk of transmission has been minimized.

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