Resumo A pandemia da COVID-19 impõe sérios desafios ao setor de transporte público por ônibus. A queda da demanda em razão do isolamento social, a intensificação dos procedimentos de higienização, a aquisição de equipamentos de proteção individual e as restrições de lotação dos veículos ameaçam a viabilidade econômico-financeira do transporte coletivo brasileiro. A pandemia da COVID-19 pode ser caracterizada como um evento de força maior, ensejando reequilíbrio econômico-financeiro dos contratos de concessão de transporte público por ônibus. Entretanto, esta solução precisa ser buscada conjuntamente, pelo poder público e pelas empresas de transporte urbano, para garantir os interesses e as necessidades de ambas as partes. Este artigo sugere ações estratégicas para que o transporte coletivo continue operando durante a pandemia e os acordos de reequilíbrio econômico-financeiro estejam alinhados com o interesse público. A superação das incertezas e consequências causadas pela pandemia exige a criação de relações de confiança e apoio mútuo entre inciativa privada (operadores) e governo.
Resumo A pandemia da COVID-19 impõe sérios desafios ao setor de transporte público por ônibus. A queda da demanda em razão do isolamento social, a intensificação dos procedimentos de higienização, a aquisição de equipamentos de proteção individual e as restrições de lotação dos veículos ameaçam a viabilidade econômico-financeira do transporte coletivo brasileiro. A pandemia da COVID-19 pode ser caracterizada como um evento de força maior, ensejando reequilíbrio econômico-financeiro dos contratos de concessão de transporte público por ônibus. Entretanto, esta solução precisa ser buscada conjuntamente, pelo poder público e pelas empresas de transporte urbano, para garantir os interesses e as necessidades de ambas as partes. Este artigo sugere ações estratégicas para que o transporte coletivo continue operando durante a pandemia e os acordos de reequilíbrio econômico-financeiro estejam alinhados com o interesse público. A superação das incertezas e consequências causadas pela pandemia exige a criação de relações de confiança e apoio mútuo entre inciativa privada (operadores) e governo.
The acquisition of active avoidance (AA) behavior is typically aided by the presence of two signals—the warning signal, which predicts the future occurrence of an aversive event (e.g., shocks), and the safety signal, which is presented upon successful avoidance of oncoming shocks. While the warning signal could be conceived to act as a Pavlovian fear cue, and is likely mediated by brain areas that underlie Pavlovian fear cue conditioning, the neural substrates underlying safety signaling are less clear, largely due to the unavailability of AA tasks that are devoid of an explicit warning signal. The present study sought to investigate the role of the ventral hippocampus (VH) in safety signaled AA performance acquired without an explicit warning signal, using a novel discrete trial paradigm. Adult male Long Evans rats were divided into two groups and trained to acquire AA responses with, or without a safety signal. Analysis of the acquisition and stable state performance data revealed that the availability of a safety signal alone did not improve the acquisition or performance of AA responses. Furthermore, post‐training, reversible VH inactivation did not impact stable state avoidance behavior. However, extinction of avoidance responses was facilitated in the group trained with a safety signal, and this effect was further potentiated by VH inactivation. Additional elevated plus maze (EPM), light–dark box, and locomotor tests demonstrated that VH inactivation reduced anxiety without affecting locomotor activity. Taken together, these results demonstrate the importance of VH in the extinction of persistent pathological avoidance behavior when safety is signaled.
Different mechanisms have been adopted by developed and developing countries over the last decades to provide urban bus services. Although competitive tendering has been considered the standard method to procure urban bus services, it cannot be treated as a ready-made solution. Contracts are incomplete by nature and, after the tender, to avoid ex-post opportunism they must be properly monitored. Additionally, developing countries, in general, have weak regulatory bodies and limited capacity to oversee public contracts. This paper aims to review the literature to gather actions that can increase the competition in public tenders and improve service quality during the life of the contract in developing countries.
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