I argue in this paper that the process of compromising needs to be deliberative if a fair compromise is the goal. More specifically, I argue that deliberation is structurally necessary in order to achieve a fair compromise. In developing this argument, this paper seeks to overcome a problematic dichotomy that is prevalent in the literature on deliberative democracy, which is the dichotomy between compromise and deliberation. This dichotomy entails the view that the process preceding the achievement of a compromise is essentially a process of negotiating or bargaining, which, I claim, should not be the case if a fair compromise is the goal. The reason for this claim is, in a nutshell, that negotiation or bargaining processes do not provide for an in-depth understanding of the reasons that each party has for holding their respective position. However, an in-depth understanding of each other’s reasons, is, as I will show, a necessary condition for achieving a fair compromise. In contrast to negotiation or bargaining, the deliberative process, by its very structure, provides for mutual understanding and is therefore a necessary condition for achieving a fair compromise.
In this paper we refute the popular metaphilosophical claim, defended by Stemplowska, Valentini and List, that some counterfactuals that ideal theorists use as assumptions are scientific idealizations, i.e., generally warranted methodological devices that are regularly used in the natural sciences. First, we argue that this claim rests on a vague and potentially misleading use of the term ‘idealization’. Secondly, referring to research in philosophy of science, we show a) that scientific and ideal theories do not share relevant common properties and, b) that ideal theoretic ‘idealizations’ do not share relevant functional roles and justification criteria with scientific idealizations. To the contrary, ideal theoretic ‘idealizations’ and scientific idealizations often turn out to be functional and epistemic opposites. We conclude the paper with a discussion of three concerns about the metaphilosophical research on ideal theory and idealizations that pertain to method, ontology and ideology.
Moral compromise, i.e. compromise on moral values, is increasingly discussed as a promising strategy for accommodating disagreement in pluralistic societies. Political theorists are primarily concerned with the question how moral compromise can be normatively justified. In particular, the debate revolves around the question whether moral compromise is justified for principled or pragmatic reasons. But assuming that moral compromise can be justified – for either principled or pragmatic reasons – is it also feasible? The literature on moral compromise largely neglects to address the issue of feasibility and this paper aims to fill this gap. With reference to research in cognitive science, I argue that moral compromise faces a feasibility problem because moral opponents tend to experience a deep emotional reluctance towards compromising on their moral values. I develop the counterintuitive claim that this reluctance, which I call 'affective aversion', is unlikely to be overcome by pragmatic reasons for compromise. Instead, I suggest that the feasibility of moral compromise increases if compromise is motivated by principled respect for other persons. Whether moral compromise is feasible therefore depends to a significant degree on whether it is motivated by pragmatic or by principled reasons. From a perspective of feasibility, principled compromise is to be preferred over pragmatic compromise.
This review article provides a topic-centered overview of the state of compromise in political theory, where compromise is increasingly discussed as a promising approach to dealing with disagreement in politics and society. Given the growing literature on compromise, a systematic approach to the topic is due. The first sections are focused on clarifying the concept of compromise, while the remainder of the article offers different perspectives on those aspects of compromise that are subject to debate.
While central planning has been identified as instrumental for implementing a wider catalogue of desirable ethical goals, such as unalienated work or self-realization, it is deemed economically unfeasible by most Analytic Marxists. We discuss the work of prominent Analytic Marxists and have identified as their three most common arguments against central planning the i) motivation, ii) innovation and iii) information feasibility constraints. According to these constraints, central planning fares significantly worse than market economies in these three domains to a degree that might not make central planning feasible. Yet, as we show, the evidence that is supposed to demonstrate the infeasibility of central planning or the superiority of markets over central planning is surprisingly weak. First, the motivation feasibility constraint primarily rests on a narrow conception of socialism as well as an empirically unsubstantiated pessimistic conception of human nature, that seems primarily ideologically motivated. Second, the innovation and information feasibility constraints primarily rest on an uncritical acceptance of the orthodox economic idea that competition and decentralized deregulation entail efficiency. We proceed by rejecting the three feasibility constraints on a conceptual and empirical level and show why recourse to the Soviet Union as an example for central planning fails to generalize about central planning simpliciter.
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