Ideal theory cannot (and should not) use scientific idealizations. A refutation of Stemplowska, Valentini and List

Abstract

In this paper we refute the popular metaphilosophical claim, defended by Stemplowska, Valentini and List, that some counterfactuals that ideal theorists use as assumptions are scientific idealizations, i.e., generally warranted methodological devices that are regularly used in the natural sciences. First, we argue that this claim rests on a vague and potentially misleading use of the term ‘idealization’. Secondly, referring to research in philosophy of science, we show a) that scientific and ideal theories do not share relevant common properties and, b) that ideal theoretic ‘idealizations’ do not share relevant functional roles and justification criteria with scientific idealizations. To the contrary, ideal theoretic ‘idealizations’ and scientific idealizations often turn out to be functional and epistemic opposites. We conclude the paper with a discussion of three concerns about the metaphilosophical research on ideal theory and idealizations that pertain to method, ontology and ideology.