This article addresses the question whether companies benefit from their commitment to corporate social responsibility (CSR). The authors argue that firms which score high on CSR activities build investor confidence and find evidence that they benefit from lower information asymmetry. The authors measure information asymmetry by insider trading, which is defined as the trading of a company’s shares by corporate insiders who have an information advantage with the aim to reap gains or avoid losses. Using a sample of U.S. firms listed in the MSCI World Index during the period 2004 to 2013 and the firm- and industry-level CSR rating from Global Engagement Service (GES), the authors show that insider transactions in firms with a high score on CSR activities lead to lower abnormal returns. This investigation extends current literature on the business case for CSR by explaining the influence of CSR activities on asymmetric information.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine how CEO narcissism can be related to the usage of an abnormal optimistic tone in financial disclosures. Drawing on upper echelons theory, this paper suggests a link between CEO characteristics, such as narcissism, and accounting choices, such as optimistic financial reporting language. Design/methodology/approach To measure the narcissistic trait of a CEO, the study builds on a model using a set of 15 archival indicators. The usage of an abnormal optimistic tone is assessed quantitatively when looking at firms’ 10-K filings, where “abnormal” refers to tone that is unrelated to a firm’s performance, risk, and complexity. This approach allows for the use of firm-fixed effects for a sample of US listed firms over the period 1992-2012. Findings The results show that CEO narcissism is significantly positively related to abnormal optimistic tone in 10-K filings. If a highly abnormal optimistic tone is present, the level of CEO narcissism is positively related to the likelihood of future seasoned equity offerings and larger future investments in research and development. Research limitations/implications The findings are relevant for shareholders and stakeholders as well as auditors and legislators. All stakeholders should be aware of the overly optimistic reporting language resulting from CEO narcissism and need to make allowances for it when assessing firm performance based on financial disclosures. Originality/value This study is the first to show in a large-scale sample how CEO narcissism can be related to a firm’s use of optimistic language, and thus contributes to the question of how personality traits affect an organization’s financial reporting strategy.

No abstract

Corroborating upper echelons theory, this study picks up the notion that narcissistic chief executive officers (CEOs) take advantage of accounting choices to enhance their firms'-and inherently their own-personal track records. Using a set of 15 indicators, reflecting the narcissistic trait of 1126 CEOs for the period 1992 to 2012, we find evidence of highly narcissistic CEOs engaging in accrual-based earnings management (ABEM). In contrast to prior research, the results show evidence not only for income-increasing but also for income-decreasing ABEM. This indicates that highly narcissistic CEOs not only strive to influence stakeholders' perception of current performance. We conclude that they also assess their potential to influence perception of current and future earnings. The results imply that highly narcissistic CEOs' accounting choices are driven by self-serving behavior rather than by the intention to provide additional information to the market. When earnings management techniques are used to derive personal advantage from the presentation of a firm's earnings, the literature refers to this as a case of low earnings quality reflecting unethical behavior. Accordingly, this study contributes to the field of business ethics by showing that CEO narcissism is related to low earnings quality in that it is associated to discretionarily decreasing accruals.

No abstract