This paper examines gender as a moderator of the fair-process effect in an ultimatum game setting. Results from games with 112 German high-school students support the hypothesis that fair procedures can decrease rejection behavior in unfair human allocation decisions. Furthermore, procedural fairness results in a statistically significant difference for women in accepting an unfair distribution. In contrast, procedural fairness appears to have no significant impact on men’s rejection behavior. However, we found no significant gender differences in the perception of procedural fairness. We conclude that, although men perceive procedural fairness similarly to women, this aspect is less important for determining their subsequent behavior.
Zusammenfassung Vertragstheoretische Ansätze zur Bekämpfung von Versicherungsbetrug basieren grundlegend auf der Annahme, dass Entscheider ausschließlich eigennützig handeln und den Erwartungsnutzen ihrer monetären Auszahlungen maximieren. Folglich wird nicht berücksichtigt, dass Versicherungsbetrug ein kriminelles Verhalten darstellt und daher für einige Individuen z.B. aus moralischen Gründen nicht in Betracht kommt. Im Rahmen dieser Arbeit werden experimentelle Befunde zu Einflussfaktoren für betrügerisches Verhalten von Gelegenheitstätern untersucht. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass ein nicht geringer Teil der Experimentteilnehmer Betrugshandlungen grundsätzlich nicht durchführt, obwohl es für sie aus rein monetärer Sicht vorteilhaft wäre. Selbstbehaltsverträge führen zu einer Zunahme betrügerischer Schadenmeldungen. Dagegen haben Informationen über das Schadenmeldeverhalten anderer Individuen einen eher unbedeutenden Einfluss auf das Betrugsverhalten der Teilnehmer, so dass die soziale Interaktion im Experiment nur zu geringen Verhaltensänderungen führt.Abstract Theoretical research examining how to fight insurance fraud is usually based on the assumption that individuals behave purely selfish and maximize exErweiterte schriftliche Fassung eines Vortrags am 11. März 2010 auf der Jahrestagung des Deutschen Vereins für Versicherungswissenschaft in Düsseldorf. Die Autoren danken dem Deutschen Verein für Versicherungswissenschaft für die finanzielle Förderung im Rahmen des Forschungsprojektes "Betrugsbekämpfung in Versicherungsmärkten unter Berücksichtigung sozialer Präferenzen: Theorie und experimentelle Befunde." 650 F. Lammers, J. Schiller pected utility from monetary payoffs. Therefore, this research does not take into account that insurance fraud constitutes an illegal behavior that some individuals never commit, e.g., due to ethical reasons. This article presents experimental findings on factors that influence fraudulent behavior of infrequent offenders. The results show that some subjects never commit fraud in the experiment, although it would have been financially profitable. Deductible contracts lead to an increase of fraudulent behavior. In contrast, information regarding other subjects' claiming behavior does not have any significant impact on the probability to commit fraud. Therefore, in our experiment social interaction only induces minor changes in behavior.
This article examines whether a principal prefers to hire a fair or a selfish agent. A fair agent cares to some extent for the well-being of other people and thus he also cares for the principal. Therefore, if the agent performs individual work, the principal is always better off to hire a fair agent. However, we show that when a third party with conflicting interests is introduced, it may be advantageous for the principal to hire a selfish agent. The reason is that the selfish agent will be a tough bargainer not only when negotiating his employment contract with the principal but also when dealing with the third party, for example, when selling the principal's product to a buyer.
This article examines the optimal organizational form of project evaluation under competition. The evaluations are carried out by two fallible screening units that sequentially assess projects. Screening can be organized as a hierarchy or a polyarchy. We show that as competitive pressure rises, the polyarchy becomes less attractive. Therefore, different organizational forms might be found in different industries depending on the degree of competition. In addition, we examine endogenous screening rules under competition: For symmetric situations, we show that polyarchies will employ higher decision thresholds compared to hierarchies. Nonetheless, as in the case of exogenous screening rules, the hierarchy becomes more attractive the higher the degree of competition.
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