<scp>Fairness in Delegated Bargaining</scp>

Lammers, Frauke

doi:10.1111/j.1530-9134.2009.00249.x

Cited by 6 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…Finally, future work could examine what drives the benefits and costs of social preferences in respect to economic performance, perhaps by experimentally varying agents' strategies through coaching. 2 Lammers (2010) shows that even in pure bargaining contexts without asymmetric information social preferences may pay off as principals prefer agents who care about customer welfare, to a limited degree, over agents who do not. Rotemberg and Saloner (1993) provide a similar analysis in a leadership context.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Social preferences and sales performance

Essl

Bieberstein

Kosfeld

et al. 2023

Economics Manag Strategy

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We use an incentivized experimental game to uncover heterogeneity in social preferences among salespeople in a large Austrian retail chain. Our results show that the majority of agents take the welfare of others into account but a significant fraction reveal selfish behavior. Matching individual behavior in the game with firm data on sales performance shows that agents with social preferences achieve a significantly higher revenue per customer. However, at the same time, they achieve fewer sales per day. Both effects offset each other, so that the overall association with total sales revenue becomes insignificant. Our findings highlight the nuanced role of selfish versus social preferences in sales contexts with important implications for economic research.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…22Lammers (2010) shows that even in pure bargaining contexts without asymmetric information social preferences may pay off as principals prefer agents who care about customer welfare, to a limited degree, over agents who do not. Rotemberg and Saloner (1993) provide a similar analysis in a leadership context.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Social preferences and sales performance

Essl

Bieberstein

Kosfeld

et al. 2023

Economics Manag Strategy

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“…7 7 Lammers (2010) analyzes the impact of fairness on the part of the delegate on ultimatum bargaining with a third party.…”

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confidence: 99%

Strategic delegation in Nash bargaining

Kirstein

2023

Manage Decis Econ

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Bargainers can increase their outcome by delegation. This paper analyzes delegation contracts consisting of two components: First, a percentage of the outcome if the delegate concludes an agreement. Second, a bonus payment if the delegate fails to do so. This paper derives the effects of these components on the principal's payoff and shows that the optimal contract is unique. Optimally, the principal offers a small share and a high reward for failure to reach an agreement. Delegate's bargaining skills play no role in the optimal contract. The condition is derived under which the optimal contract benefits the principal.

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“…Lammers (2010) shows that even in pure bargaining contexts without asymmetric information social preferences may pay off as principals prefer agents who care about customer welfare, to a limited degree, over agents who do not.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%